respondents viewed the independence of Algeria‘s judiciary negatively.310 the Mozambique CRR notes: ‗Excessive powers of the executive vis-à-vis the legislature and judiciary leads to the perception that members of the executive are above the law and violations of the law by the government officials will go unchallenged.‘301 The Ethiopia CRR notes that the independence of the judiciary is respected at higher levels, but sometimes interfered with at lower levels.311 It also points out that in contrast to the position in other countries, the courts do not resolve disputes around constitutional interpretations – this function is left to the House of the Federation. This is because the Ethiopian political system assumes that resolving constitutional issues is largely a political matter. The CRR obliquely critiques this by arguing that ‗the arrangement portends a possible difficulty. In a dispute that is, or is perceived to be, related to partisan politics, an impartial judicial decision would be more readily accepted and respected than one by a single-partydominated House of the Federation which would be seen as a judge in its own cause contrary to the cardinal principle of natural justice.‘312 Other countries, such as Algeria, Ethiopia, Rwanda and Uganda, evince more profound problems.302 It appears that the overall state of the political environment in these countries has contributed to failures in constitutionalism. In Uganda the CRR notes that the cultural underpinnings of constitutionalism in that country are ‗embryonic‘.303 The Rwanda CRR examines the political context in greater detail, noting: ‗The approaches taken by the Rwandan Constitution to the principles of separation of powers, political competition and organisation, and enjoyment of fundamental civil and political freedoms are consciously directed towards building national unity, consensus and inclusiveness, given its past.‘304 It also argues that the manner in which the state in Rwanda is structured and functions essentially leads to a fusion of powers rather than a separation.305 This manifests itself in highly restrictive outcomes for civil liberties. Across the CRRs, other challenges to constitutionalism are identified. The Ethiopia and Tanzania CRRs note that dominant party regimes create a situation where political loyalties override the institutional separation that is essential for balancing power.313 This is obliquely recognised in the South Africa CRR as well: while South Africa‘s legislature has done much commendable work in giving expression to the will of the people, it has not distinguished itself in holding the executive to account. 314 The judiciary and the rule of law are accorded special attention in RRs. The CRRs often refers to cases where courts are attempting to enforce the law but are finding it difficult to do so. In some cases, this arises from general resource and capacity constraints as well as corruption.306 For some countries – such as Algeria and Mozambique – the CRRs refer to a lack of tradition of independent judiciaries and constitutional litigation.307 But concerns about judicial independence emerge repeatedly in the various CRRs. This may take the form of political ‗manipulation‘ or ‗pressure‘ on the judiciary – as in Nigeria308 and Uganda309 – or more formalised systems that restrict its authority. The Algeria CRR contends that there are some serious ambiguities in the manner in which the judiciary is managed – noting that the country‘s president presides over the Higher Council of the Magistracy, which in turn oversees the judiciary. There are also concerns about the political allegiance of judges and their handling of sensitive cases; referring to an opinion survey undertaken for Algeria‘s APRM process, the CRR notes that more than half of 301 302 303 304 305 306 307 308 309 Another important challenge for the development of constitutionalism in Africa is the weakness – relative to the executive – of its legislatures. The legislative branch of government is meant most directly to represent the citizens, and to hold the executive branch of the state to account. While the track record of the continent‘s legislatures is as varied as the countries themselves, in general they are regarded as having not performed this responsibility very well. The CRRs discuss the influence exerted over national legislatures by their executives, even where constitutional provisions affirm parliaments‘ independence and enjoin them to exercise oversight.315 In addition, a range of other problems are identified. The Nigeria CRR mentions corruption on the part of representatives.316 In South Africa, the CRR notes that the legislature has devoted most of its energy to legislating, and has not developed its oversight 310 Mozambique CRR, p. 111. Algeria CRR, pp. 87–88; Rwanda CRR, p. 42; Uganda CRR, p. 83. Uganda CRR, p. 59. Rwanda CRR, p. 30. Rwanda CRR, p. 42. Mozambique CRR, p. 110; Nigeria CRR, pp. 102–103. Algeria CRR, p. 84; Mozambique CRR, p. 110. Nigeria CRR, pp. 102–103. Uganda CRR, p. 84. 311 312 313 314 315 316 58 Algeria CRR, p. 86. Ethiopia CRR, p. 99. Ethiopia CRR, p. 98 (italics in original) Ethiopia CRR, p. 97; Tanzania CRR, p. 55. South Africa CRR, pp. 102–103. Algeria CRR, pp. 85-87; Benin CRR, p. 95; Burkina Faso, p. 118; Kenya CRR, p. 72; Lesotho CRR, p. 45; Mozambique CRR, p. 148; Sierra Leone CRR, p. 123; Zambia CRR, p. 109. Nigeria CRR, p. 110.