CHAPTER THREE: DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL GOVERNANCE _____________________________________________________________________ within parties, hidden financing of political parties and electoral campaigns, profiteering and political corruption, and so on. The particularly privileged position of the majority party – the CDP – is the subject of numerous complaints: monopolisation of the structure and infrastructure resulting from the revolution, benefiting from the means of the state and the administration, hidden financing, partisan collaboration by administrative authorities, excessive use of its dominant position, influence peddling and intimidation of people, a subtly maintained confusion between state and party, active cells of the party within the administration, etc. Combined with a favourable ballot system, the extreme prevalence of the majority party threatens the chances of real democratic rotation in practice. The occurrence of such recriminations requires that special attention be paid to this issue in order that institutions may become balanced and a credible democracy may be built. 174. The call for the institution of independent candidatures is a pressing one in the light of the foregoing so as to take charge of their problems and ensure better representation of the people, who appear to be becoming increasingly less confident in a party that ‘disappears’ from the ground outside periods of election. 175. The electoral system of Burkina Faso is not free of suspicion as regards its ability to ensure fair and equitable competition in the context of free and transparent elections. Discussions with the political and intellectual class as a whole have been used by the CRM in the absence of minimum consensus on all the rules of the democratic process, an absence that is undoubtedly related to the particular circumstances associated with the return to multiparty democracy (such as the absence of a national conference or similar forum). What is significant in this sense is that the major advances have occurred after the occurrence of deep crises. All the stakeholders agree, however, that enormous progress has been made with the process of electoral consultation. The handover by the territorial administration to an independent body presided over by civil society was, from this point of view, a decisive evolutionary occurrence. Indeed, since 2001, following the case of Norbert Zongo, an autonomous institution (the CENI) has existed in Burkina Faso that has a consensual basis and is responsible for organising all elections. Box no. 3.5: CENI, or the challenge of holding transparent elections Over the course of various elections, CENI has become the centrepiece of the electoral process in the country. Composed of 15 members (whose appointment is for a period of five years, renewable only once) – including five nominated by the majority parties, five nominated by the opposition and five nominated by civil society, including the president – the commission is responsible for preparing and managing the entire electoral process. In every constituency of the territory, CENI establishes branches that function only at the time of elections. This intermittence constitutes a real constraint, since the setting up of such branches before each election is part of the problem of eternal repetition. Even if the cost argument advanced by the government is to be considered seriously, it is clear that intermittent operation of the branches of CENI results in a lack of professionalism on the part of the election administration throughout the territory, in difficulties regarding ownership of the 100