Rule 4.1 Constitutional Court Rules 1994 establishes 30 days for the petition to be filled. The petitioner, in affidavit filed with the motion depones that the notice of intended acquisition was received by him late. Senior State Counsel submitted that “according to the Ministry, it went out a couple of days after it was dated…” In exceptional cases, on the application of the principle “ex non cogit ad imposibilia” this Court has jurisdiction to entertain a petition filed out of time if “sufficient reasons” has been adduced by the petitioner to purge the default” As the respondents have admitted a delay in posting the notice… and has not been able to state with certainty as to what the delay was, the deeming provision in Section 55.1 of the Interpretation and General Provisions Act cannot be applied. Accordingly we rule that the petitioner has adduced sufficient reasons for the delay, and in the circumstances retrospectively extend the time of filing of the petition, thereby accepting the petition already filed. VI.1. Case 10/2001 Roy Nora V The Minister of Land Use and Habitat, the Attorney General Under article 46.1 of the Const alleging that the acquisition of a part of land belonging to the petitioner contravenes his right to property in article 26 of the Constitution, as it as not done in the public interest. The petitioner has a dwelling house and a shed thereon. The Minister of Land Use and Habitat, has in terms of section 3.1 of the Acquisition of Land on Public Interest Act 1996, decided that a portion of that land should be acquired to promote public welfare and benefit to eight families residing in adjoining parcels. Supporting the defence the respondents further clarified that the government has no other way of providing those 8 families with alternative access to their properties as there is no suitable land for this project and that the acquisition of the portion of land or the road reserve, would leave the petitioner with part of his land which does not affect the dwelling or the shed. The main contention of the Counsel for the Petitioner was that the acquisition would promote no public interest, but only Private Interest. He submitted that the promotion of the welfare and benefit of 8 families cannot be considered as being public interest. Distinguished the terms public interest and public purpose and stated that the former term was wider in scope than the latter. Hence the term public interest being of wider application would include public purpose as well. The proposed acquisition was therefore for a public purpose. The acquisition of land in the Public Interest is a recognised derogation to the right to property contained in article 26.1 of the Constitution. The function of the Court is however to review whether the Minister exercised his discretion correctly when he decided… and that there was reasonable justification for causing any hardship…