Decentralisation 154. The CSAR [p.65] considers decentralisation in the URT at two levels: (i) political devolution, i.e. “decentralisation at the local government authorities”; and (ii) “decentralisation within the central Government.” Political devolution focuses on “the effectiveness of the decentralized mechanisms in terms of decision-making, resource allocation, institutional capacity, and service delivery.” The main focus of decentralisation within the central administration is on Executive Agencies, (twenty in number) created by the Executive Agencies Act No. 9 of 1999. These Agencies are expected to be semi-autonomous, each operating at “arms length from their parent ministry.” In pursuit of decentralisation at both levels, the central Government introduced and developed legal and institutional mechanisms - including instruments and procedures - to bind the decentralised agencies in the local Governments and within the central administration in relation to their management and disbursement of public funds. [CSAR, p. 67]. 155. On decentralisation at the level of local Government authorities, the CSAR [p. 68] reports that the “dominant opinion” from the household survey is that “devolution of power…is still inadequate”; while 6.9 per cent of the expert survey respondents say that the level of improvement is highly appreciable; 41.2 per cent that it is appreciable; 40 per cent that it is moderate; 9.8 per cent that it is negligible; and 2 per cent that there is no improvement at all. 156. However, in the case of Zanzibar, the CSAR [p. 69] concludes that, “the process of devolution of power to the grassroots has been seriously constrained by the political hostilities between the two political parties.” As a result, “the level of decentralisation of administrative responsibility is very low,” in Zanzibar.   Civilian control of the security forces 157. The CSAR [p. 69] identifies the following provisions of the 1977 Constitution relating to civilian control of the defence and security forces in the URT: (i) Article 147(2), which vests in the President of the URT - as Commanderin-Chief of the Armed Forces - the power to appoint and remove the head of the armed forces; (ii)Article 63(3), which subjects the armed forces to oversight by the country’s legislature, empowering the legislature to authorise the military budget and to scrutinise their audited accounts submitted by the Controller and Auditor-General; and (iii) Article 107A, which “vests the final authority of the administration of justice in the judiciary”, thereby making “the defense and security forces [subject to] oversight of the judiciary.” 158. The CSAR [page 69] refers to incidents when the armed forces and the police acted in contravention of the rule of law. The most striking was the Zanzibar killings of 27 January 2001 during which the police “used excessive force”. More than 30 people were killed and several others wounded among people demonstrating against the 2001 election results in Zanzibar. 159. The CSAR [page 70] concludes that findings from household and expert opinion surveys, conducted as part of the Tanzania country self-assessment, “suggest that more serious efforts are needed to make the [country’s] defense and security forces subjected to the rule of law and make them more professional and responsive to public interest beyond regime’s interest.” II. Findings of the CRM The Constitution: Rule of law, political rights and institutions protecting rights 160. As noted in Chapter Two, the URT came into existence on 26 April 1964 with the union of Tanganyika – having attained independence in 1961 - and Zanzibar, which became independent in December 1963. The instrument creating the Union came into force with the adoption of the 1964 Interim Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania. 161. Prior to the establishment of the URT, Tanganyika had two constitutions. These were (i) the 1961 Independence Constitution, and (ii) the 1962 Republican Constitution. Zanzibar has had three constitutions since its 52