408. The CSAR [pp. 113-115] points to the following milestones in the fight against corruption in the country: (i) the establishment in 1966 of the ombudsman-like Permanent Commission of Inquiry, replaced in 2001 by the Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance; (ii) the creation of the Anti-Corruption Squad in 199568; (iii) the enactment of the 1948 Economic and Organized Crimes Control Act; (iv) further amendments in 1991 to the Anti-Corruption Act of 197169; (vi) the enactment of the 2006 Anti-Money Laundering Act, and the establishment of the Financial Intelligence Unit that followed, and Zanzibar’s 2009 Anti-Money Laundering and Proceeds of Crime Act No. 10; and, (vii) the repeal and replacement of the 1971 Prevention and Combating Corruption Act in 2007 by the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Act (2007), and the establishment of the Prevention and Combating Bureau.70  409. The picture that emerges from these milestones is one of sustained attempts to fight corruption, especially in Mainland Tanzania. There were also challenges in view of the changing cultural, political, socio-economic and technological environment that was a backdrop to the fight against corruption and its limited success nationally. The CSAR [p.114] notes that a major achievement in this combat was the enactment of the 2007 Prevention and Combating of Corruption Act which gave the new anti-corruption agency, the Prevention and Combating Corruption Bureau (PCCB), “more legal force…increased power and mandate…and widened the scope of corruption offences…” 410. However, according to the CSAR [p.115], in view of the operational arrangements for bureau oversight by the Committee for Control and Evaluation, the perception is that PCCB is a state security agency: “the arrangement tightens the grip of the Executive on PCCB and makes its operations largely dependent on the whims of the President.”71 411. In the case of Zanzibar, the CSAR [p. 121] points out that Decree No. 10 of 1985, the Penal Amendment Act repealed the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Decree of 1975. As a result, the Decree “diluted the special status of anti-corruption bodies,” in Zanzibar and “officially disbanded” the special Anti-Corruption Unit, with “corruption now treated just like any other offence investigated by the Police under special direction of the Attorney General.” 412. The CSAR [p. 119] points out that between 1995 and 2011, 47,283 allegations of corruption were received; 934 public officers were punished administratively for corruption offences; 256 corrupt offenders were convicted; and, Tshs. 97.1 Billion was recovered by the Prevention and Combating Corruption Bureau. Moreover, according to the CSAR, 798 cases were filed in courts since the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Act, 2007. The CSAR [p.118] lists a number of major cases, especially in the energy, minerals and banking sectors, that are indicative of a trend towards the prosecution of grand corruption in the country.72 413. In spite of the signal these cases send out that, “the culture of impunity on grand corruption cases…is giving way to accountable governance,” the CSAR [p. 120] notes that, “the perception of corruption in Tanzania today is rather bleak,” constituting “a sensitive political issue and an issue of wider public debate.” Indeed, the CSAR [pp. 120-121] reports that 50.8 per cent of the APRM household survey respondents, are of the opinion that current national anti-corruption measures are unlikely to bear the expected results, while 41 per cent of elite survey respondents “think that the measures and actions taken to combat corruption in the country are less effective.” 68 located initially in the Prime Minister’s Office and later in the President’s Office, as a specialised enforcement institution to implement the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act of 1971, as amended in 1974, though it was subordinated to the authority of the Director of Public Prosecution. 69 This necessitated the establishment of the Prevention of Corruption Bureau to replace the Anti-Corruption Squad, and with powers to investigate corruption offences, conduct research on corruption, raise public awareness on corruption, prosecute and give advice to any entity in the fight against corruption in the country, among other functions; (v) the creation of the Ethics Secretariat in 1995 “to monitor corruption among the leadership fraternity” in Mainland Tanzania only, following the enactment of the Public Leadership Code of Ethics Act No. 13 of 1995. 70 To be overseen by the Committee for Control and Evaluation, as successor to the Prevention of Corruption Bureau, and with powers not only to prosecute more corruption and related offences, but also to require any public official to give account of all properties in his/her possession and agent, and how such properties were acquired. 71 The CSAR [p.117] sees the arrangement as “the key deficiency” in the design of the country’s fight against corruption, because the “independence of an anti-corruption bureau is a fundamental requirement for its efficiency in discharging its functions.” This observation leads the CSAR to conclude that, “when …corruption is endemic and systemic in a country with relatively weak law enforcement institutions, a sufficiently strong and independent anti-corruption institution is needed.” 72 (i) the Radar Deal with the British firm, BAE; (ii) the Bank of Tanzania Twin Tower Scandal; (iii) Alex Stewart (ASSAYERS), Buzwagi Mining Contract; (iv) Mchuchuma Mining Deal; (v) Mwananchi Gold Deal; (vi) the Richmond Power Generation Ltd; (vii) the corruption case against a former Tanzanian envoy to Italy and former Counsellor at the Embassy; (viii) charges of abuse of office against two former ministers of the URT; and (ix) abuse of office case against, and the subsequent conviction of a former Bank of Tanzania Director of Personnel and Administration. 93