APRM • SECOND COUNTRY REVIEW REPORT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KENYA 114 In addition, the Political Parties Act, 2012 “prohibits the registration of any party that is founded on, among other things, ethnicity, or uses words, slogans, emblems or symbols which could arouse ethnic, age, tribal, racial, gender, regional, linguistic, corporatist, professional or religious division. It also prohibits the registration of a party that has a constitution or operational ethic that provides in any way for discriminatory practices contrary to the provisions of the Constitution or of any written law”. 3.5.2 Findings of the Review Mission 3.5.2.1 Progress made since 2006 Review 115. As highlighted by the CSAR, Kenya has put in place mechanisms to prevent and respond to intra and inter-conflicts since the 2006 Review. It promulgated a new Constitution and a strong network of institutions and enabling legislation, based on the unfortunate experience of 2007-2008, to better prevent, reduce and manage intra-state and inter-state conflicts and provide for a more efficient and effective security infrastructure. Specifically, it has changed the environment for political and socio-economic development, providing the required framework for inclusion. Its expanding role as mediator in regional and continental conflicts, has also sharpened its capacity to manage conflict and build peace at home. 116. The Review Mission confirmed that sources of conflicts include poverty, corruption, lack of access to resources, growing inequality youth unemployment, election and election-related ethno-regional tension heightened by fears of domination in a political economy based on a winner-takes-all mindset, criminal and terrorist elements with easy access to light and not so light weaponry often backed by international and regional networks, operating in border communities or crossing into urban communities with suspected local collaborators, and climate-change induced pressure on resources. 117. Consultations throughout the country underscored the positive gains of devolution in the area of security, given its potentials for inclusiveness, enhancing good governance and grassroots participation on socioeconomic development, and for assuaging longheld feelings of historical injustice arising from unequal distribution of national resources. On the other hand, devolution has created new fault lies and in instances worsened old ones in this regard. Perceptions of unequal distribution of resources arising from partisan considerations persist even in the face of evidence to the contrary in terms of well laid out constitutional provisions in this regard. The result is that devolution has worked in specific instances, including opposition strongholds, to deepen ethnic and partisan political cleavages against the backdrop of perceptions of the persistence at local and national levels of a tendency to monopolise power by ethno-regional groups, coupled with fears of drives toward ethnic hegemony and ethnic capture. As a result, there is evidence of a network of intolerant political interests built around key persons and divisive symbols. The situation is made worse by the language of leaders, which requires to be toned down, and the tendency of leaders at all levels to reject unfavourable election outcomes. The relative inactivity of political parties at the county level, largely a reflection of the relative weakness of party structures in the long period between elections, has left the field widely open for mobilization of local communities in manners often contrary to democratic ethics. | 88 |