Several of the CRRs – such as those of Mauritius, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia95 – point to overlapping membership of Africa‘s RECs as an impediment to integration efforts. It appears that short-term political calculations rather than AU decisions on regional configuration dictate national choices as to which RECs to join.96 measures taken against some South African goods although both are members of SADC.107 Infrastructure is also a significant impediment to regional integration. As one analysis commented, ‗a sorely neglected aspect of integration in Africa is the link between regional integration and Africa‘s regional infrastructure‘.108 Several of the CRRs record the obstacles posed by poor infrastructure to economic activity, and thus to integration.109 The inadequate transport infrastructure is of particular importance, which raises the cost of trade. The Burkina Faso report identified physical impediments to subregional trade, including ―the poor state of the transport infrastructure and the age of the trucks used in interstate transport‖.110 The Rwanda CRR argues that better infrastructure is essential if the country is to earn a reputation as a competitive investment destination.111 The CRRs also show that difficulties in implementing complex reforms are holding up integration processes. The Uganda,97 Benin98 and Tanzania99 CRRs, for example, address this. Some countries have serious capacity challenges to develop and implement trade and development policies. The Mozambique CRR, for example, notes that while tourism promises significant economic opportunities, the country lacks a tourism policy.100 Likewise, Lesotho‘s CRR indicates that the country does not have ‗documented‘ trade policy, but an ‗implied‘ one.101 Security and stability issues also complicate integration plans. Where security threats or instability arise in any country, its neighbours are likely to seek to shield themselves by restricting contact, and making bordercrossings more difficult. As a report by the UNECA observed, peace and security continue to pose ―major challenges affecting Africa‘s integration and development efforts‖.112 Budgetary considerations have also played a role in shaping the trajectory of integration. Since regional integration often requires reducing tariffs, this can mean a significant reduction in national tax revenues, especially in some of the continent‘s smallest and poorest countries. Such concerns appear in several of the CRRs. The Rwanda CRR, for example, points to a fall in customs revenues owing to its implementation of COMESA trade liberalisation commitments.102 Concerns about lost customs revenues are also evident in the reports of Ghana, Kenya and Uganda.103 Meanwhile, the Ethiopia CRR indicates that concerns about potential lost revenues had delayed Ethiopia‘s decision to participate in the COMESA free trade area.104 Similar challenges to integration include protectionist instincts, as specifically mentioned in the CRRs for Burkina Faso CRR105 and Nigeria106. The Mauritius CRR also notes trade 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 Conflict and insecurity are addressed in many of the CRRs, but not typically in relation to regional integration. The Uganda CRR provides some comment on this issue, remarking that the country‘s relationship with neighbouring DRC – described as ‗tense and prone to conflict‘ – as undermining integration in the region.113 Dr Mohammed Ibn Chambas, former ECOWAS president, argues that security crises have diverted ECOWAS from its developmental ambitions since the 1990s.114 Crises in Mauritius CRR, p. 233; Tanzania CRR, p. 134; Uganda CRR, pp. 165, 167; Zambia CRR, pp. 181, 182. Ndomo A, Regional Economic Communities in Africa: A Progress Overview (GTZ Study, May 2009) p. 10. Uganda CRR, p. 167. Benin CRR, pp. 176, 177. Tanzania CRR, p. 136. Mozambique CRR, p. 191. Lesotho CRR, p. 131. Rwanda CRR, p. 71. Ghana CRR, p. 71; Kenya CRR, p. 96; Uganda CRR, pp. 167, 165. Ethiopia CRR, p. 171. For example, the Burkina Faso CRR (p. 237) describes a „persistent tendency to protect local production‟. For example, the Nigeria CRR (pp. 199206) notes an apparent contradiction between Nigeria‟s commitment to liberalise trade under the ECOWAS regime while also imposing significant 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 30 import duties (in some cases as high as 150% ad valorem on agricultural imports) and export bans on selected products. Mauritius CRR, p. 224. Jerome A and D Nabena, „Infrastructure and regional integration in Africa‟, in Levine DH and D Nagar (eds.), Regionbuilding in Africa: political and economic challenges (New York: Palgrave McMillan, 2016), p. 90. Burkina Faso CRR, p. 237; Sierra Leone CRR, p. 217; Tanzania CRR, p. 136; Uganda CRR, pp. 164, 167. Burkina Faso CRR, p. 217. Rwanda CRR, p. 71. UNECA, Progress on Regional Integration in Africa‟, Seventh Session of the Committee on Trade, Regional Cooperation and Integration (Addis Ababa 2–3 June 2011) p. 10. Uganda CRR, p. 56. Wilson Center, „The Role of ECOWAS in Achieving the Economic Integration of West Africa‟ (19 October 2007).