CHAPTER THREE: DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL GOVERNANCE _____________________________________________________________________ 258. In accordance with the status of magistrates, sitting judges can in principle be dismissed, but only for disciplinary reasons, and then only on the basis of a specific disciplinary procedure invoked before the CSM. Prosecutors, however, remain subject to the authority of the chancery. They have little security of tenure and their careers (appointments and transfers) are essentially determined by the custodian of the seals. They are, moreover, appointed by the president of Faso, who is head of the Executive. The same applies to presidents of courts and tribunals, as well as to judges sitting in the lower courts, which seems to be a sure limitation of the principle of separation of executive and judicial powers. There is little division between sitting judges and the prosecutor, since the magistrate can move from one to the other following on promotions. 259. Even if, despite some shortcomings, these laws are in line with international standards, the situation with regard to practice and the means available to the courts endangers the scope of the independence and efficiency of justice. One element jeopardising the independence of the judiciary is certainly the constitution itself, and especially Articles 131 and 132 thereof, which ironically make the president of Burkina Faso, as chief executive, the guarantor of the independence of justice and the authority responsible for appointing judges. The constitution subordinates the CSM – which is, in fact, the disciplinary tribunal in respect of judges – by assigning it the role of providing assistance and advice. The minister of justice sits as the vicechairperson of this body. Moreover, the minister of justice and the custodian of the seals, who is a member of the Executive, make proposals for the appointment of magistrates, and initiate and investigate disciplinary matters concerning judges before the CSM. The president of Burkina Faso does not participate in the CSM when it hears disciplinary cases. These disciplinary cases are chaired by the president of the Court of Annulment. 260. The strong position of the Executive and of full-fledged members within the CSM, and the subordination of this fundamental body to the security and preservation of the independence of the judiciary – particularly in relation to the Executive – appear in fact to considerably undermine the separation of powers and the independence of the magistracy. Such separation and independence are further undermined by poor conditions of service (such as poor salaries, and this despite the recent increase in the salaries of judges); by the clearly insufficient number of judges at all levels (less than 300 judges in total, all levels combined), as well as assistants, court officials and secretaries; and by insufficient equipment – and this despite the extensive PANRJ so rightly mentioned in the CSAR. 261. If the presidents of the courts and tribunals are effectively the appropriators of funds on budgets of their respective jurisdiction, the fact still remains that they depend on the Parliament and the government (particularly the Ministry of Finance) respectively for the determination of the amount of the budget vote allocated to the Justice Department and the disbursement of the funds voted. This somewhat puts into perspective the effectiveness, though constitutionally proclaimed, of the independence of judicial power. Visits on the ground 125