CHAPTER THREE: DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL GOVERNANCE _____________________________________________________________________ hunger for power, the ‘presidential parties’ control all the levers of parliamentary action. 249. This collusion, combined with a weak institutional capacity with regard to national representation, endangers, in a lasting way, the function of parliamentary control, which has become the most important function of the National Assembly. The constitution, in Article 105, does however assign it a strong role to this effect, with the assistance of the Audit Office. The CRM has noted that Parliament asks many written, oral and topical questions on various issues and has set up several fact-finding missions and commissions of investigation, which, in view of the rather lengthy and complex procedure, need to be reviewed. In addition, reports on the activities of the National Assembly are published regularly. The CRM has also noted with satisfaction the introduction of an annual meeting with local elected representatives, to the extent that there is now an annual Parliament and a civil society forum. 250. On the other hand, the situation of the opposition and the issue of the definition of the role of the leader of the opposition remain issues of great concern. Although a law on the status of the opposition was adopted in 2001, it has not been possible to apply such law satisfactorily as a result of the ambiguous definition of the role of the opposition and its leader, and given the specific nature of the regime and of the supporter process in Burkina Faso. Under the law, the leader of the opposition is the leader of the party with the highest number of MPs after the majority party. However, the question that must be asked is what happens when such party chooses to join the government majority that has become part of the presidential group, as was found by the CRM on the occasion of its visit? 251. The unfairness of the partisan and electoral game and the overly strong attraction of the presidential group have contributed to the destruction and dismantling of the opposition (41 MPs in the previous legislature as opposed to 15 MPs at best within the present National Assembly totalling 111 MPs), to the extent that the opposition no longer constitutes a counterweight to the presidential group, which has become too significant. The real opposition numbers less than one-fifth of MPs required for referral of a matter to the Constitutional Council. Thus the viability of a constitutional democracy without real opposition has to be questioned. 252. The mission welcomes Parliament’s willingness to reopen the debate on the question of reviewing the rules of the democratic process in order to ensure greater transparency and fairness. It believes, however, that the legislature does not constitute a satisfactory framework for the negotiation of a consensual solution; hence the need for a framework of wider consultation, the findings of which would be ratified through the legislative process. 253. In any event, the parliamentary opposition is well represented in the bureau and in all bodies of the National Assembly. This also applies to women (who number 16). The CRM recorded during its work on the ground that the population considers that it is not adequately represented by its MPs – 123