Chapter three: Democracy and good political governance of violence that it escalates, leading to a blockage of the process of governing, to a widening split between state and society, to the withdrawal of the allegiance of some groups, and to outbreaks of violence. 149. The potential for normal political conflict to degenerate into violence is greater in the fragile environment of relatively new democracies. In such a fragile environment, violent conflicts are invariably the result of the failure by the political elite to manage differences and divergences within the political system through negotiations, coalitions, pacts, and informal as well as formal practices of governing, including accommodative practices. The struggle for power and the perquisites of power often lead to political-class factionalism, fragmentation and violence. This is the context of conflict in Lesotho. Political conflict 150. The CRM validates the contention of the CSAR that flawed leadership by the political elite is the root cause of both intraparty and interparty conflict in Lesotho. Conflict results from the intense rivalry among the political elite over access to state power and resources in the context of poor resource endowment and the lack of a vibrant and productive private sector. Thus, the electoral contest becomes a bitter zero-sum struggle, since electoral defeat could mean a loss of livelihood. This is confirmed by the lamentation of a member of the political elite: “I took a risk and impoverished myself.” The intense rivalry of the elite has led to the fragmentation and multiplication of political parties, 20 of which are officially registered. In its consultations with the IEC, the CRM found that a party is required to contest a minimum of 10 parliamentary seats for it to be considered for the share of compensatory proportional seats. This, it is hoped, will have the effect of reducing the number of political parties in the country. 151. It is this context of bitter rivalry of the elite, and of what is now seen as a flawed electoral system (the FPTP system), that eventually plunged Lesotho into violent conflict following the 1998 general elections. The BCP, the BNP and the MFP disputed the landslide victory in the electoral race by the ruling LCD. The LCD had won 79 out of 80 parliamentary seats, leaving one seat to the BNP. The protestation over the electoral outcome underscored the BCP’s bitterness that the LCD had broken away from it and had formed a government following the party split of 1997. Following the floor crossing by members of the LCD, the BCP suddenly found itself in opposition, although it had won the 1993 election. This generated animosity, which still persists between the BCP and the LCD. Thus the challenge regarding the LCD election victory in 1998 coalesced with the BCP’s political challenge of the legitimacy of the LCD regime following the 1997 split. 152. Protest demonstrations by the opposition parties gravitated to violent encounters between the ruling party and the three opposition parties, which had formed an alliance to dislodge the ruling party even before the election. Internal and external initiatives designed to seek peaceful resolution of the conflict proved futile. Consequently, the government invited intervention from Botswana, Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe. South Africa intervened promptly and was later joined by Botswana. Ultimately, the Lesotho conflict was resolved both through military intervention and negotiation. External military intervention was meant to quell the riots and to neutralise the army as well, which was seen to have pinned its sympathies with the opposition alliance. 55