Chapter three: Democracy and good political governance and more representational electoral system. The results of the 2002 general elections replicated the pattern of the 1993 and 1998 elections, with the winning parties dominating. However, the MMP ensured that more than six smaller parties were also represented in Parliament. The new model thus infused the country’s Parliament with more diverse political opinion following the national elections. 138. The CSAR states that intraparty conflicts reflect the depth of deficiency in terms of internal party democracy in the Kingdom of Lesotho. Founding fathers of political parties tend to become authoritarian and intolerant of dissent and run parties as personal properties. Central party structures assume condescending dominance over branches and disregard the choices and decisions of the branches. Such undemocratic practices precipitate intraparty contestation over leadership, policies, direction and resources. Often, resort is had to the law courts for the settlement of disputes, but the ultimate loser is invariably the party in fragmentation. The CSAR underscores popular opinion that weak, party-conflict management systems are the root causes of continued and increasing conflicts that often spill over into the social sphere and degenerate into national crisis. Institutional conflict 139. The CSAR identifies three types of institutional conflict. The first is the conflict between armed state apparatuses – essentially the Lesotho Defence Force (LDF) and the Lesotho Mounted Police – and the government. The sources of the tension between the security services and the government can be traced back to the extensive politicisation of the security services during the 27 years of authoritarian under the BNP regime (1966–1986) and the military (1986–1993). Civil control over the military during the first phase of redemocratisation from 1993 to 1998 was problematic. The postelection conflict of 1998 provided the spark for a mutiny that involved the kidnapping and murder of government officials, including Deputy Prime Minister Selometsi Baholo, and the humiliation of the senior command by the rank and file. However, the security sector reforms initiated in both the military and the police have generally reduced the threats to national stability emanating from this type of institutional conflict. 140. The second form of institutional conflict occurs between elements of the public service and the government. Again, such conflicts are rooted in the politicisation and mismanagement of the civil service during the civil authoritarian and military regimes. 141. The third manifestation of institutional conflict has been the tension between traditional governance institutions, that is, the chieftaincy system, and the new local government structures. The powers and the role of the democratically based local governance structures appear to have generated a sense of alienation, marginalisation and insecurity on the part of some of the chiefs. The competition for power, resources and the support of communities between chiefs and elected council officials has the potential to degenerate into conflict and thereby constitutes a source of destabilisation. Socioeconomic conflict 142. Socioeconomic deprivation, or poverty, and inequity constitute the crux of structural internal conflict. Factors identified by the CSAR as contributing to the structural sources of conflict include 53