Democracy and Political Governance Chapter 3 Chapter 3 Oversight mechanisms for the civil service: the PAC of Parliament and the NAO 239. The oversight mechanisms for the civil service revolve round two main bodies: the PAC of Parliament and the NAO. 240. The PAC conducts hearings in camera. This is a tradition that started before independence. It applies to all select committees of the National Assembly. This is a great surprise from an accountability perspective. It is true that certain accounts of governments might need examining in camera. It is also true that the PAC eventually makes its reports public and that the chairperson of the PAC is a member of the opposition. However, one would expect in a democracy that closed meetings would be rare and concern only certain forms of expenditure, especially those on national defence. Examining all accounts behind closed doors will not promote good governance. Doing so will reduce the ‘public’ nature of these accounts and will not promote transparency. However, the criticisms by the director of audit are more worrying. They suggest that the PAC is not as assertive and effective as it should be. Some comments on these criticisms follow immediately below. 241. 242. 122 This review will refer extensively to the report of the director of the NAO (called the auditor general in some countries) on the “Accounts of the Republic of Mauritius for the Year Ended 30 June 2008” to increase understanding of the oversight role this office plays. The relevant parts are the introduction and chapter 4 (pp 13 to 16), called “Review of the Recommendations Made in My Annual Audit Report, 2006-07”. Section 4.3 deals with internal audits. The director noted, contrary to what was reported for the previous year (2006/2007) about improvements in internal auditing, that the “situation had deteriorated” in 2007/2008. This gives the impression that some ministries and departments underrate audits generally and internal audits and quality assurance (guaranteed through effective internal audits) in particular. The four examples below illustrate this. The director stated in his introduction that the NAO had existed for 40 years and had fulfilled its mandate every year throughout that period. However, from the comments heard from various sources and the letters and correspondence received at the office, both signed and anonymous, it transpired that many stakeholders were unaware of the mandate, role, duties and powers of the director of audit. According to the report, “many civil servants are ignorant as Democracy and Political Governance well”, and quite a number of them (and the number was growing), including high officials, have refused for some time to give his officers the information, records and other documents needed for auditing purposes. Some of them provided the information after considerable delay and offered lame excuses for the delay. There are also cases where it was only after the office had completed the audit and the audit staff had left the site that the director of audit was informed “that the information was supposedly now available”. Towards the end of his introduction, the director notes that some high officials in the civil service do not even bother to read his reports! 243. Secondly, in section 4.2 (on accountability and reporting), the director stated that he had noted in the 2007/2008 report that 272 certified financial statements had not been put before the National Assembly. Quite a number of these financial statements had, in fact, already been submitted to the parent ministries. However, they had not taken any action to enable the minister to put these financial statements before the National Assembly. 244. Thirdly, ministries and departments were conducting internal audits badly. The director of audit reported that, contrary to what the 2006/2007 report noted about improvements in internal auditing, the situation had deteriorated in 2007/2008. He noted that, with the exception of a few ministries or departments, the problems reported since 2003 were recurring. He listed these as: • • • • • • • • • • • Lack of involvement or interest in the work of Internal Control Units (ICUs) by accounting officers. Lack of supervision and control over ICU staff. Managers denying responsibility for internal audits. No real reviews of the plans, work and reports of ICUs. Accounting officers ‘blind’ signing of the internal audit charter. Limited auditing of the accounts of ministries. Lack of adequate staff. Poor standards of auditing. ICUs conducting audits of accounts that NAO staff have already audited. Inadequate training in modern internal auditing. The MECHR has started to shift its role from that of ‘firefighting’, i.e. attending to minor problems that arise now and then in schools and colleges, to a more proactive role such as the establishment of the Primary School Renewal Project. 123