52. The twofold mandate, far from representing a unified policy choice, potentially set up an inherently problematic dichotomy: activities to promote the second part of the mandate (a historical record) undermining the successful attainment of the first (just trials). The length of time preceding court appearances combined with the failure to establish and publicise a historical record of the events of the Derg period has meant that, for a large proportion of Ethiopia’s overwhelmingly young population, the proceedings have an almost surreal air. This situation is very different from 1992 when legislation mandating the SPO was drawn up. In an attempt to influence urban populations that had seen little of the war in the north, the TGE took the initiative of screening a highly distressing video of the bombardment of the port. 53. It is important not to underestimate the importance of the Special Prosecution for families and communities whose members were victims of Derg-era crimes. What is frustrating, however, has been the failure in forging a national consensus in the fight against impunity, from one generation to the next. 54. What is understood by many to have been the release of some defendants on political rather than judicial grounds has served to undermine confidence in the basis for the continuing – and now extremely protracted – detention of the rest. Both of these problems have been compounded by failures to engage in projects of public education and historical documentation about the past. As a result of this combination of factors, the potential moral and political weight of the Ethiopian Special Prosecutions as a force in the fight against impunity - both globally and within Ethiopia - has been tremendously blunted. It seems that an invaluable opportunity to demonstrate the legal, political, and moral potential of domestic judicial proceedings in Africa has been lost. 2.4 The Economy 55. By the beginning of the 1990s, the Ethiopian economy was in deep crisis. The return to relative peace after the defeat of the Derg, and the installation of the EPRDF government in 1991, provided a historical opportunity for recovery. One of the cardinal and declared aims of the new economic policy, publicised by the Ethiopian government in November 1991, was to remove the disincentives and other anomalies inherited from the Mengistu regime. 56. Economic reforms, initiated in 1988 by the Derg government as a ‘mixed economy’ alternative to the controlled economy, were further implemented and took on the form of a structural adjustment programme, with donor support, from 1994. Early measures included agricultural market liberalisation, price liberalisation, a large devaluation, tax reforms, and some steps towards international trade liberalisation. 57. During the latter part of the 1990s, the new reforms focused more on the financial sector, privatisation, fertiliser market reforms, and initiatives regarding - 54 -