freedoms of citizens. The report further notes that the Constitution vests the organisation of the Security Services and oversight over them in the House of Peoples’ Representatives ( HoPR). II. Findings of the CRM Supremacy of the Constitution and Rule of Law 148. There was a general consensus during the CRM consultations that since the overthrow of the Derg in July 1991, and viewed against a history of authoritarian rule dating back to imperial rule, Ethiopia has been making gradual but steady progress. Occasional bumps occur along the way in developing and strengthening a political culture of the supremacy of the constitution and institutionalising government under the rule of law. 149. In its consultations with various stakeholders, the CRM was impressed by the general faith in, and commitment to, the intrinsic and instrumental value of democracy in ensuring the survival and sustainable development of the country. The consensus was that national institutions for promoting democracy, like the Human Rights Commission, the National Election Board of Ethiopia, the Federal Anti-Corruption Commission, and the Ombudsman, must therefore, and of necessity, be strengthened and consolidated so that they would provide the anchor for good governance, peace, security and development. 150. Yet there was also a general agreement that major constraints continue to impede the development of democracy and the institutions to promote it. They stem from the combination of a residual anti-democratic political culture dating back to the imperial and Derg years, and poverty and capacity constraints notably financial and human resource constraints - which must be resolutely tackled and overcome. 151. The CRM observes undercurrents of perceptions, especially among opposition groups, that critical institutions and agencies like the FEACC and the NEBE are not independent.18 Although the CRM was given no proof or concrete evidence 18 The CSAR of Ethiopia states that “there is little consensus on the institutional independence and credibility of the FEACC. Two concerns revolve around this issue. First, the fact that the Commission is answerable to the Prime Minister rather than to Parliament, in the eyes of some observers, has cast doubt on its operational independence and raises the possibility that it may be subject to executive interference in its operations. Second, there are allegations that it might be used as a political tool to neutralize political opponents...”.Page 169. The CSAR further states that “in a Focus Group Discussion (FGD) with these groups, many believed that the Commission was not independent and lacked integrity in carrying out its mission. The predominant view was that it was highly partisan in its activities in serving the Government and the ruling party…” Page 171 - 84 -