CHAPTER THREE: DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL GOVERNANCE __________________________________________________________________________ social pressures – which give rise to interference in legal proceedings, corruption and greed, uncertainties, and conflicts between authorities or within one authority – all greatly undermine the independence and prestige of the judiciary. The judiciary is therefore seen by the public as being very ‘sick’, notwithstanding the efforts of several honest and competent judges. iii. Recommendations of the APR Panel 231. In order to guarantee the separation and balance of powers, the APR Panel recommends: 232. 98  Institutional capacity building for the National Assembly by recruiting and training parliamentary staff (Parliament).  Improving the status and service conditions of parliamentary staff by introducing a career development plan, salary increments, and so on (Parliament).  Depoliticising the staff by making them work as public officials in the service of the nation rather than for any particular political group (Parliament).  Opening parliamentary offices in every district (Parliament).  Providing further training for MPs in the work of Parliament, in methods of executive control, for parliamentary missions and in the necessity to be answerable to the electorate (Parliament, possibly with the cooperation of development partners).  Reviewing establishment laws and the Electoral Provisions Act on the appointment of MPs to ensure better representation (at least one MP for each district), and to take into account gender balance and age (Parliament and government). In order to consolidate the independence of the courts and the judiciary, the APR Panel recommends:  Providing greater autonomy for the JSC from the Executive, seeing that the president of the republic and the minister of justice are also the chairman and second vice-chairman respectively of the JSC (government, Parliament, the Constitutional Court, the JSC and judicial workers’ unions).  Accelerating the implementation of the PIRSJ, and updating the data on the various components if necessary (government and Parliament, with assistance from development partners).  Setting up an ad hoc inspection, performance evaluation and anticorruption task force within the judiciary. This should comprise representatives from all sectors of the judicial system selected for their