to “principles…which can only be realised in a democratic society in which the Executive is accountable to a Legislative composed of elected members and representatives of the people and also a Judiciary, which is independent and dispenses justice without fear or favour, thereby ensuring that all human rights are preserved and protected and that the duties of every person are faithfully discharged.” These principles are further expanded in Part II of the Constitution as the “fundamental objectives and directive principles of state policy.” 203. Further findings of the CRM include the following provisions enunciating constitutional supremacy: • Article 4(4) of the 1977 URT Constitution, building on the principle of the separation of powers implied under Article 4(1)(2), establishes the supremacy of the constitution. It provides that “each organ specified in this Article shall be established and shall discharge its functions in accordance with the other provisions of this Constitution.” In other words, the three organs or branches of Government derive their respective power and functions from the constitution which establishes them, and which stipulates not only the procedures for exercising but also the extent and limits of the power and functions of each organ. More importantly, constitutional supremacy, as enunciated under this Article, also requires that no organ of Government, but especially the legislative organ, shall upset or rupture the structure, distribution and the separation of powers between the organs; • Article 26(2) vests in every citizen the right and virtually the locus standi to initiate legal action to defend and protect the constitution from violation; • Article 107A confers the authority of dispensing justice in the URT on the Judiciary, while Article 107B stipulates that, “in exercising the powers of dispensing justice, all courts shall have freedom and shall be required only to observe the provisions of the Constitution and those of the laws of the land”; • Where the interpretation or the application of the 1977 URT Constitution is in dispute between the URT and Zanzibar, the supremacy of the constitution is provided for under Article 126(1), which vests in the Special Constitutional Court of the United Republic “the sole function to hear and give a conciliatory decision over the dispute”; and, • The supremacy of the constitution in Tanzania is also provided for by the special requirement, or procedure for amending the constitution and altering the division of powers between the organs of Government, and the two levels of the two-Government structure, under Article 98(1) (a) and Article 98(1) (b) of the 1977 Constitution. 204. In general, the supremacy of the constitution has been maintained, although there was some controversy over the extent of, and limits to, constitutional provisions for executive and parliamentary powers and, by extension, judicial powers. To illustrate: Tanzania has experienced a dual executive-legislative challenge about the extent to which national judicial powers may strike down legislation enacted through the joint effort of the executive and legislature. 205. The more often cited examples of such a challenge revolve around court decisions in cases about the limits to the constitutional powers of the legislature under the human rights, elections, and access to justice provisions of the constitution. Prominent cases in question that featured in public debates were the following: a) The case of Rev. Mtikila: in 1994, the High Court ruled that it was unconstitutional to bar independent candidates from standing in elections. If they wished to organise electioneering campaigns or rallies, political parties were required to obtain permits from the authorities. Acting in concert with the Executive, Parliament passed a constitutional amendment to the effect that only candidates sponsored by political parties had the right to stand for elections. The 1992 Political Parties Act was also amended: political parties were required to give at least forty-eight hours notice to the police before convening a political rally. This would give the police discretionary powers to refuse or deny the political party permission to hold the rally, ostensibly for reasons of state. b) The Julius Ishengoma Francis Ndyanabo v. Attorney-General case of 2001 in which the Court of Appeal in 2002 held as unconstitutional and struck down the provision of s.111 (2) of the Elections Act, 1985. This provision required the advance security deposit of Tsh 5 million prior to consideration of any petition challenging the election results. This decision was laid down on the grounds that it denied the petitioner, particularly indigent petitioners, the fundamental human right of access to justice. As the CSAR [page103] 60