146. The CSAR [p.58] concludes that, “on the whole there is still a long way to go before one can confidently and objectively believe that there is adequate respect for the rule of law in Tanzania.” Political pluralism and periodic competitive electoral politics 147. Describing and analyzing the constitutional and political framework of electoral governance in the URT, particularly the role of the National Electoral Commission (NEC) and the Zanzibar Electoral Commission (ZEC), the CSAR points to “serious cracks” in the constitutional and political framework for competitive party and electoral politics, and pluralism generally, in Tanzania. 148. The cracks include: (i) public funding of political parties, disproportionately favouring the ruling party, CCM [p.42]; (ii) the increasing concern that “big money” from undisclosed sources is becoming a serious threat not only to competitive party and electoral politics but also to the whole practice of democracy and Government accountability [p.43]; (iii) the provisions of the Political Parties Act No. 5 of 1992 which, “has discouraged initiatives by opposition parties to form electoral alliances and contest elections as a unified bloc against the ruling party” [p.44]; (iv) disregard for the court decision allowing independent candidates to stand for elections at all levels [CSAR, p.45]; (v) the retention of the “majoritarian or simple plurality” electoral system, which the ruling party “vigorously” defends, as against “a mixed electoral system,” for which opposition parties are advocating [p.47]. 149. Other cracks relate to: (i) concerns about the independence and impartiality of the National Electoral Commission (NEC) and the Zanzibar Electoral Commission (ZEC), because of the mode of appointing and removing their members, and, in the case of ZEC, “the de facto fusion between the ruling party and the Election Management Body” [CSAR, p. 47] ; (ii) Constitutional provisions, whereby entertaining and adjudicating disputes over the results of presidential elections declared by NEC are ousted from the jurisdiction of the courts [p.48-51]; and, (iii) the constraining, “oppressive,” and “restrictive” legal provisions, such as under Section 12(i) of the Societies’ Act, governing the operations and activities of subsidiary associations such as civil society organisations. Supremacy of the Constitution 150. The CSAR [page 64] points out that the 1977 Constitution stipulates, under Article 8(1)(a), that sovereignty shall reside in the people, from whom the Government, through the constitution, shall derive all its power and authority. Article 64(5) provides for the supremacy of the Constitution, which “shall have the force of law in the whole of the United Republic”. The Article further stipulates that,“….in event any other law conflicts with the provisions contained in this Constitution, the Constitution shall prevail and that other law, to the extent of the inconsistency with the Constitution, shall be void.” 151. The CSAR (p.64) notes that the supremacy of the constitution is also provided for under Article 98 of the Constitution, which stipulates that “the vote required to pass a Bill on Constitutional amendment must reach two-thirds of all the Members [of Parliament],” although “if the amendment sought to be made relates to Union matters in the First Schedule of the Constitution, the vote required is two-thirds of all the Members [of Parliament] from Mainland Tanzania and two-thirds of all the Members [of Parliament] from Tanzania Zanzibar.” 152. The CSAR draws attention to “instances where the legislature has been in tension with the judiciary on the question of [the] supremacy of the constitution.” The major cause of tension arises from the provision of the 5th Constitutional Amendment, which contains the Bill of Rights. The amendment vests in the Judiciary “the power… to declare Acts of Parliament unconstitutional where [the judiciary] is satisfied that such Acts of Parliament were made in excess of the power given to [Parliament] by the Constitution.” 153. The CSAR [p.65] observes that tension between the judiciary and legislature over this provision reached boiling point in 1993. This was when the Speaker of the National Assembly, reacting to the declaration of the judiciary that various parliamentary enactments were unconstitutional, called upon the legislature to exercise its power to check the judiciary. The Tanganyika Law Society and legal academics, among others, viewed the call “as an act of serious erosion of the supremacy of the constitution for the parliament itself is the creature of the constitution.” 51