YEARS Allegations Received Cases Investigated Completed Investigation files Administrative actions taken Files transferred to other agencies New cases into courts Total cases Prosecuted Conviction cases Acquittal cases Saved Money/ Asset recovered 2010 5,685 870 924 29 135 224 587 64 98 10,123,258,300/= 2011 4,765 819 773 30 84 193 466 52 61 4,638,939,558/= 2012 (Jan) 337 39 386 1 4 25 30 2 2 3,641,854/= TOTAL 51,964 16,882 11,911 2,492 1,512 3,595 308 490 964 93,538,352,664 Source: PCCB/HQ, February 2012. 630. It is noted that although 51,964 allegations were received between 1995 and January 2012, and a number of administrative actions taken against public servants proven to have taken bribes, it is understood that not all reported allegations relate to corruption. It is noted that only 4.9 per cent of the reported cases since the new Act (PCCA, 2007) became operational were filed in court while the number of convictions against corrupt offenders since 1995 was less than one per cent of cases reported. Further, the total amount of assets recovered is not significant. 631. The CRM notes that the emergence of a market-driven economy and a competitive environment aggravated the problem of corruption. All stakeholders in the Tanzanian economy recognise this fact and there is a general perception that the problem is becoming widespread. Both overt and covert corrupt activities - impunity in business deals and bribery in government offices - appear to be on the rise, and both non-state and state stakeholders are in agreement with this position. Non-state stakeholders almost everywhere told the CRM that they perceive the police, the judiciary and TRA to be the most corrupt in the country. In the commercial world, private investors are alleged to take advantage of loopholes in investment laws to financially exploit the economy. 632. The CRM confirmed that Government has gone a long way to develop policies and measures to combat this vice. However, it is widely agreed by all stakeholders that the measures under implementation are either weak or inadequately backed by a firm commitment on the part of the political leadership. Further, the proposed actions specified in the NPoA may not be monitorable in quantitative terms. In addition they have ambitious and possibly unrealistic time-frames and budgetary implications. 633. The CRM confirmed the existence of six institutions of accountability dealing with corruption in Tanzania. They are: (a) the National Audit Office; (b) the Public Procurement and Regulatory Authority; (c) the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau; (d) the Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance; (e) the Ethics Secretariat; and, (f) Parliament. The CRM noted that institutions’ performance in enhancing accountability and combating corruption has not been significant. This observation is confirmed by, for example, Peter Bofin and Daniel Kobb (2011). They examined the effectiveness of these institutions and concluded that, “By most international measures Tanzania performs relatively poorly in terms of accountability, corruption and governance”103. Again, the issue of inadequate capacity - especially manpower - emerges as the main constraint. In addition, the CRM noted that the PCCB mandate is not well understood at all levels of society and the institution has not been decentralised below district level. 634. While positive steps continue to be taken to combat corruption, stakeholders concur that more political commitment from the top is a prerequisite for solving accountability and corruption issues. The CRM is of the view that involving civil society in the anti-corruption war as well as increasing public awareness, will contribute to improve the image of the country. Transparency International - in its Worldwide Corruption Perception Ratings of Countries (2011) - shows that Tanzania’s rating in terms of government effectiveness in combating corruption 103 How effective is institutional oversight in Tanzania? An examination of accountability institutions, Peter Bofin and Daniel Kobb (2001) 132