393. The CRM is concerned that weak public procurement and contracting by EAs seriously undermines state effectiveness in Tanzania. Procurement accounted for 30 per cent of the FY 2007/08 budget, reaching an estimated TShs. 1.8 trillion. Procurement by Executive Agencies comprises the largest proportion of all public sector consumption of goods and services in Tanzania at 39 per cent, government and ministries (17 per cent). Independent departments, LGAs, regional secretaries and urban water authorities account for the remaining 14 per cent. Public works procured by Executive Agencies, parastatals and ministries account for 58 per cent of all procurement, and goods procured by parastatals, independent departments, as well as government ministries, account for 31 per cent.65 TANROADS, by far the largest EA, had public works which accounted for 30 per cent of the national budget for FY 2010.66 An audit report concluded that TANROADS does not offer value for money due to poor planning and design, ineffective controls and coordination, and a lack of transparency [in procurement].67 Indeed, the CRM learnt that during the 2009-10 budget season. TANROADS was criticized for entering into numerous multi-million US dollar contracts, terminated for poor performance. This implies that the tendering process was ineffective or not sufficiently transparent and accountable. 394. Tanzania’s ongoing Local Government Reform Programme (LGRP II) - under the broader Public Sector Reform Program - has the highest bearing on public service delivery, especially in rural districts and wards. LGRP II is the second phase of government reform efforts concerning local government operations for the period 20082013. Its overriding aim is to strengthen LGA capacity in public service delivery at the local level. Government policy on the October 1998 Local Government Reforms now guides LGRP II. The LGRP focus was on transforming LGAs into socio-economic development strategic coordination institutions, aiming to ensure that in their areas of jurisdiction, local Government authorities are accountable and transparent over social service delivery for poverty reduction in Tanzania. 395. The CRM established that according to local government reform policy, LGAs are to assume a greater role in service delivery. Sector ministries are to restrict themselves to providing guidance on sectoral issues, setting policy, and determining sector-specific delivery standards and performance monitoring. The President’s Office on Regional Administration and Local Government (PO-RALG) plays an overall coordinating and support role throughout the reform process. 396. The CRM learnt that Regional Secretariats (RSs) are one of the most powerful structures in the overall scheme of LGRP. They are essentially the de-concentrated arm of central government, headed by a centrally-appointed Regional Administrative Secretary. Local service delivery-related sector ministries (health, education, water and sanitation, agriculture and roads) are all represented in the RS, which are supposed to be the immediate points of referral for LGAs in their dealings with central government. Although they do not operate as superior organs of state in all respects, the RS do have oversight functions over local budgets and are responsible for monitoring LGA service delivery. 397. One salient aspect of Tanzania’s LGRP with a direct impact on service delivery efficiency and accountability is local government personnel management. Although the 1998 LGRP explicitly stated its vision of local government personnel management: “The councils (city, municipal, town and district) will be fully responsible for planning, recruiting, rewarding, promoting, disciplining, development and firing of all their personnel,” in practice, the system is very fragmented and still highly centralised. The CRM found that central government has maintained the upper hand in personnel management although officially, staff are ‘employees’ of the local Government authorities. 398. The CRM further learnt that several local government personnel management processes remain centralised. These processes include the following: budget and establishment controls; all decisions relating to staff budget and numbers of approved staff are ultimately done by the PO-PSM; pay policy, except that LGAs are allowed to establish local incentive schemes; career management has been partially devolved, although senior staff career progress continues to depend on the central government ministries. The main concern here is that the net effect of this fragmented system of staff management is dual allegiance: staff trying to satisfy both local government (their official employer) and central government. During CRM field visits, several LGAs intimated that capacity building was challenging where after investments are made in LGA staff they are transferred to other LGAs or B. Cooksey, Ibid., p. 41. National Accounting Office, 2010 Value for Money Audit Report, cited in Cooksey, Ibid., p. 44. 67 Ibid. P. 44. 65 66 90