152 Murray, Long, Ayeni and Somé/Monitoring implementation of decisions implementation of cases from the African Court and Commission, as well as the regional treaty bodies in Europe and the Americas and some of the treaty bodies in the UN. It has taken a handful of cases from nine States, three in each of the regions (Africa, the Americas and Europe), and examined the extent to which the recommendations or reparations ordered have been implemented by the State. Desk-based research, and interviews with government officials, the victims, litigants, parliamentarians, the judiciary, national human rights institutions (NHRIs), civil society and others, as well as representatives from the respective treaty bodies, have enabled us to identify factors that impact on the implementation of these decisions and judgments.4 This article focuses on the monitoring of implementation of decisions and judgments of the African Commission and African Court, and not on other findings such as Concluding Observations or resolutions issued by the African Commission. We use the term ‘implementation’ to refer to the process by which individual or collective measures are taken (through legislation, judicial decision, administrative action, executive decree, or other steps) to give effect to an adverse judgment or decision.5 This is distinguished from ‘compliance’, which is a status that is attained if and when a State’s law and practice are in line with the requirements of the judgment or decision, as interpreted by the responsible international body.6 Thus, compliance is understood as the outcome of implementation: a state implements a judgment or decision in order to ensure that it is in compliance with its obligations under this ruling. African human rights bodies use the terms ‘monitoring’ or ‘following-up’ decisions and judgments that we consider broader terms to cover the formal and informal processes of oversight of the human rights bodies, and it is these which this article examines. While acknowledging that the monitoring of implementation cannot be the sole responsibility of the respective treaty bodies, this article concentrates specifically on the role of two human rights treaty body mechanisms (the Commission and the Court) established within the AU. The contribution of the other AU organs, including the Assembly of the Union (AU Assembly), Executive Council, Peace and Security Council (PSC), Permanent Representatives 4 For information on the project, see http://www.bristol.ac.uk/law/research/centresthemes/hric/projects/implementationandcompliance/#d.en.278672 (accessed 10 October 2017). This is an independent research project funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) of the United Kingdom. Interviews have been conducted under the University of Bristol’s rules on ethical research. This has required that interviewee consent be obtained to attribute them in publications arising from the research and anonymity, if requested, will be respected at all times. Therefore, quotations cited in this article do not identify their authors. All interviews are held on file with the research team, which includes the co-authors of this article. 5 See M Burgstaller Theories of compliance with international law (2004) 4; R Murray & D Long The implementation of the findings of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (2015) 28; VO Ayeni ‘Introduction’ in VO Ayeni (ed) The impact of the African Charter and the Maputo Protocol in selected African states (2016) 9. 6 K Raustiala ‘Compliance and effectiveness in international regulatory cooperation’ (2000) 32 Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 388-391; B Kingsbury ‘The concept of compliance as a function of competing conceptions of international law’ (1998) 19 Michigan Journal of International Law 345.