case of Sierra Leone, some services cannot be provided outside the capital Freetown.262  Another issue is the institutional design of civil service systems in the wake of decentralisation. This has resulted in the creation of new subnational governments, which are not ‗harmonised‘ with one another. Civil servants cannot easily transition between levels, and civil servants at different levels are supervised by different agencies with different rules. Several CRRs note that decentralisation has stretched the capacities of central government, as it is responsible for monitoring the lower levels.263 To this should be added the potential for conflict between different levels of government. There may also be competition between different tiers of government for the limited funds that residents can contribute in taxes. In Ghana, officials in central government have complained that their counterparts at local level urge payment of local taxes instead of national ones.264   These are echoed in other CRRs, too. The Benin CRR cities a lack of confidence in the justice system, stemming in part from corruption.271 It also notes that some tax inspectors had their own firms and ‗operated with total impunity‘.272 The Mozambique CRR refers to the involvement of civil servants in corruption around state contracts.273 In Lesotho, there are problems with civil servants holding private business interests. 274 The question then becomes how to move towards a system of heightened professionalism and accountability – or what might be termed a ‗responsive‘ civil service. This will involve capacitating individual civil servants, with skills and an ethical and professional orientation. One scholar suggests that a possible solution may be to identify ‗islands of effectiveness‘ in Africa‘s civil services. This refers to the skills and commitments that already exist, especially those at management level; the officials demonstrating these attributes should be rewarded and capacitated to perform their duties and help change the ‗balance of incentives‘ inside civil service organisations.275 Finally, some CRRs note that placing the continent‘s civil services on a footing of heightened professionalism will require more than just resources, systems and legal sanctions. They demand changes in mindset.276 The same point is made in one of the implementation reports on Mozambique. It reports government assurances about strict adherence to apolitical, merit-based hiring and promotions, but also comments that: ‗the challenge in this aspect is not limited to the removal/existence of party cells rather it is necessary to build a professional, incorruptible and transparent public service which among other aspects there is a strong need for continuous training of the public servants on the issue of public good.‘277 While adequate motivations and remuneration can do a great deal to enhance the performance of the continent‘s civil In some cases, poor remuneration contributes to the problems.265 In others, an overall lethargy and indifference on the part of the civil service slows down the performance of its duties.266 Politicisation and patronage undermine professionalism by privileging people‘s opinions or loyalties over merit and potential to perform the tasks required.267 Corruption, maladministration and the flouting of rules, in particular, loom large in many of the reports.268 This takes many forms, including outright extortion of clients, self-enrichment and the phenomenon of ‗ghost workers‘ (non-existent employees who draw salaries).269 The Nigeria CRR lists a number of relevant expressions of corruption: 270   262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 payroll fraud; politically-driven patronage protect guilty people; systems legislation – in this case the Official Secrets Act – that allow officials to keep information out of the public domain; nepotism in recruitment and promotion; and lack of disclosure of funding of political parties. that Sierra Leone CRR, p. 132. Nigeria CRR, p. 108; South Africa CRR, p. 107; Benin CRR, p. 100; Rwanda CRR, p. 44. Fjeldstad O-H and K Heggstad,‟ Local Government Mobilisation in Anglophone Africa‟ (Chr. Michelsen Institute, WP 2012: 6, October 2012) p.7. Nigeria CRR, p. 109; Algeria CRR, p. 94; Benin CRR, p.102. Nigeria CRR, p. 106. Burkina Faso CRR, p. 132; Kenya CRR, pp. 94-95; Ethiopia CRR, p. 101; Benin CRR, p. 101; Zambia CRR, p. 113, Mozambique CRR, p. 125. Algeria CRR, p. 95; Ethiopia CRR, p. 101; Kenya CRR, p. 94; Nigeria CRR, pp. 107, 115; Rwanda CRR, p. 44; Uganda CRR, p. 286. Nigeria CRR, p. 107. Nigeria CRR, pp. 115-116. 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 53 Benin CRR, p. 86. Benin CRR, p. 222. Mozambique CRR, p. 98. Lesotho CRR, p. 163. Crook RC, „Rethinking civil service reform in Africa: “islands of effectiveness” and organisational commitment‟, Commonwealth and Comparative Politics (Vol 48, No 4) pp. 479-504. Nigeria CRR, p. 107; Lesotho CRR, p. 77. Mozambique African Peer Review Mechanism National Forum, Progress report on the implementation of the National APRM Programme of Action, 2010-2012 (April 2013) p. 22.