CHAPTER THREE: DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL GOVERNANCE _____________________________________________________________________ whatever their political affiliation – who disappear once elected and return only to solicit their votes by handing out small gifts and electoral gadgets. 254. Moreover, the weak institutional capacity of the National Assembly, as admitted to by the MPs themselves, should be criticised. One cannot therefore avoid the issue of the weakness and decline of Parliament, an issue that is very present in Burkina Faso. Such weakness and decline encompass the following: the weakness and under-equipment of the National Assembly; a lack of offices; MPs who are not always well trained; a lack of consistent parliamentary support (two assistants for a commission and authorisation to hire two assistants for a parliamentary group); a poorly trained and highly politicised administration; the weakness of legislative initiatives; a lack of executives and experts necessary for effective control of government action; the slowness of deliberations; the low intellectual and technical quality of debates; a lack of permanence in parliamentary constituencies; and so on. 255. The urgency of a programme to restore the prestige of Parliament and strengthen its capabilities must be stressed. Neither the Strategic Plan for the Development of Parliament 2004-2014 nor the Special Programme for Institutional Capacity Building of the National Assembly has so far been able to resolve the problem in a satisfactory way. While the Special Programme was launched only in 2007, with a horizon of the year 2010 – and it would undoubtedly be premature to make an assessment regarding it at this stage – there is good evidence to indicate that its strengthening and the rigorous execution thereof are urgently required. It should be noted, however, that the present legislature is the one that has the highest intellectual level recorded under the Fourth Republic. 256. Independence of the judicial power. The independence of the judiciary in Burkina Faso should be considered generically in terms of the independence of all courts vis-à-vis other powers. This allows one to consider proper courts such as the Audit Office and the State Council, in addition to the Court of Annulment and lower courts. The case of the Constitutional Council has already been addressed. 257. The independence of judges is provided for at the normative level by texts of great importance, such as by the constitution (Article 129: ‘The judiciary is independent’) and by several laws on the CSM, on the status of the judiciary, and on the Constitutional Council, the State Council and the Supreme Court, including the new status of members of the Supreme Court that is now being adopted. The constitution provides that “the judicial power is entrusted to the judges”. Magistrates are generally not subject to a mandate that limits the period of performance of their duties. They are appointed and, in principle, like sitting judges, have security of tenure. This is one of the criteria commonly accepted by all legal systems, in particular as regards judges. This thus testifies to the independence of the judiciary in the country, an independence that is enshrined in Article 130 of the constitution of Burkina Faso. 124