CHAPTER THREE: DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL GOVERNANCE _____________________________________________________________________ districts – two of which have a specific status – and 302 rural districts). After many delays and much hesitation related to the search for a Burkinabe ‘way’ of local governance that takes into account the endogenous realities as well as issues of poverty alleviation and sustainable development (see the Acts of 1993 and 1998), all forums for consultation, deliberation and the enforcement of judgments are now operational. This advance in the process is to be commended. However, notwithstanding the constitutional basis of decentralisation, and notwithstanding the principle of progressiveness that guides the implementation of the process, many concerns have been raised regarding the chances of success of administrative decentralisation in Burkina Faso, since constraints are numerous. Box no. 3.6: The implementation of the decentralisation process: a Herculean challenge The success of the process of implementing decentralisation is dependent on the ability of the Burkina Faso state to overcome the constraints identified during the work of the CRM. In many ways, this challenge is akin to the 12 labours of Hercules. The first set of constraints relates to the very ownership by different actors of the concept and issues of decentralisation – whether in the case of the decentralised authorities of the state (governors, high commissioners and, above all, prefects), local representatives, or grassroots populations and their traditional and religious leaders. The urgency of sensitisation campaigns, the elimination of illiteracy, training and capacity building must be stressed, particularly as three-quarters of municipal councillors are illiterate, 80% of the population is rural and peasant, and confusion or conflict of jurisdiction between various authorities are numerous. The second set of constraints relates to the lack of infrastructure, equipment and good-quality human and financial resources to support decentralisation, despite the significant efforts being made by the state. The general consensus is that the transfer of powers was not accompanied by a similar transfer of means, thereby adversely affecting the viability of many districts and causing them to be unable to take over the management of local affairs. A third group of constraints relates to the distribution of powers between authorities and decentralised authorities, especially with regard to municipalities. The similarity between the territory of the municipality and the department (decentralised constituency) seems to be the problem, and conflicts of jurisdiction between mayors and prefects have regularly been decried. It is because of this that the proposal is repeatedly made to abolish the departmental level of deconcentration. A fourth group of constraints – and constraints that are generally raised by the CDP – relates to political and personal infighting, corruption, the manipulation of elected representatives by their local leaders, and the transhumance or nomadism of advisers. The consequence of such constraints is instability of councils and, sometimes, paralysis with regard to the deliberations and functioning of districts. In addition, problems have been identified with regard to cooperation between village development councils and municipal councillors, with the former being excluded from participation in the office of the latter. The need for greater clarification of local affairs and of the rules relating to the division of powers is necessary in order to ensure optimisation of decentralisation. In addition, nonpayment of officials such as mayors, councillors and chairpersons of regional councils adds to the problem, and this can hardly encourage their availability and effectiveness. Consequently, it is important to put an end to this volunteer work. 106