Chapter four: Economic governance and management Objective 4: Fight corruption and money laundering i. Summary of the CSAR Fight corruption 454. The CSAR assesses the level of corruption and the measures taken to combat it in both the public and private sectors. The report also highlights the extent to which money laundering is prevalent in the country and the effectiveness of measures taken by Lesotho to fight it. A national public attitude survey on democracy, markets and civil society, conducted in 2003, indicates that corruption was perceived to be highest among border officials, with 30 per cent of respondents saying “most” or “all” are involved in it. They are followed by the police (28 per cent), government officials (27 per cent), and the Office of the Prime Minister (11 per cent). Public perception of corruption is similar for the private sector (both local and foreign business), magistrates and judges, which is not much higher than that for religious leaders. Surveys of political attitudes and values in Lesotho, conducted in 2000, 2003 and 2005, indicate that local authorities are perceived to be less corrupt than the central government. Respondents believe that teachers and principals are least corrupt, followed by health workers and local officials. 455. In 1999, Parliament enacted the Prevention of Corruption and Economic Offences (PCEO) Act that established the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Offences (DCEO) in 2003. The functions of the directorate include investigating suspected practices of corruption in public bodies and public education and to prevent corruption. The Act empowers the minister of public service to require any public official to dispose of direct and indirect financial interests in any undertaking as well as of interests which are incompatible with the discharge of the public duties of such an official. 456. Other oversight institutions are the PAC and OAG. The former is a 15-member parliamentary oversight committee. Its function includes examining public funds and it can call upon officials up to the level of principal secretaries to appear before it. It also has the power to investigate and call on any minister to review specific ministerial decisions. It reviews reports presented by the OAG. However, the PAC and OAG appear to lack the power and capacity to fight and root out corruption. They have limited capacity to investigate and review cases. The DCEO is seriously understaffed in very critical sectors. It cannot recruit its staff directly and depends on what has been labelled a very inefficient Public Service Commission (PSC). 457. The OAG, on the other hand, is not fully independent. The office is currently funded through a budget determined by the minister of finance and development planning and its staff are public servants subject to, and under the regulations of, the public service. More importantly, the auditor general operates under, and is housed by, the MoFDP. What most seriously compromises her current powers and efficiency is that she also reports to Parliament through the minister of finance and development planning. In recognition of this weakness, plans are under way to reform the office through an Act of Parliament. This reform would make the auditor general more powerful, as is stipulated in the constitution, and independent by actually separating the office from the public service. Finally, while the PAC has investigative powers and can call upon ministers, especially 127