Economic Governance and Management Chapter 4 leader of the opposition. It has four divisions: corruption investigation, corruption prevention and education, legal, and administration and finance. The activities of ICAC centre on four areas: (i) education, public sensitisation and awareness; (ii) preventing corruption via the recommendations it makes to various government agencies on what should be done to reduce the risk of corruption; (iii) preparing and disseminating information on best practice and anticorruption materials; and (iv) investigating cases of corruption. One shortcoming in its mandate is that it may only prosecute cases of corruption if it has the approval of the DPP. The authorities may want to revisit this restriction, as it gives the impression that the hands of ICAC are tied. 575. 218 ICAC cooperates with a number of institutions that deal with corruption. The FIU focuses on money laundering. The NAO is responsible for external audits of public finances. The MRA collects all government revenues. The CPB manages government procurement. It also works with the MOFEE. The work of the FIU follows below, while chapter 3 and objective 3 in this chapter deal with the other institutions. 576. During the first few years of its existence, ICAC was plagued with a number of problems. These included a lack of trained staff, shortages of other capabilities and internal dissension. Even the present managers of ICAC acknowledge that, because of these constraints, ICAC was not effective during its early years. This negative assessment of ICAC persists among high-level officials. 577. ICAC started to launch energetic efforts to build its capacity, especially its human resources, in 2006. It now has a staff of 140 and an active training programme. Staff training happens twice a week. According to the director of ICAC, it was only after 2006 that the institution became truly operational. 578. ICAC publishes annual reports that describe its activities and assess its performance. The 2007/2008 report shows that the number of corruption cases reported to ICAC increased from 900 in 2006/2007 to 1,100 in 2007/2008. Significantly, the number of cases reported by individuals who were willing to be identified increased from 347 to 578 during the same period. Live investigations increased from 608 at the end of June 2007 to 702 at the end of June 2008. In 2006/2007, 36 cases were referred to the DPP. The DPP agreed to prosecute 23 of them. The comparable figures for 2007/2008 were 59 and 21 respectively. Other measures indicate increased activity over time by ICAC. Chapter 4 Economic Governance and Management 579. However, increased activity does not necessarily mean increased effectiveness. While the management of ICAC believes that it is carrying out its mandate effectively, most stakeholders and members of the public do not share this view. The main complaint against ICAC is that its investigations are very slow and rarely result in prosecutions and convictions. The attention of the CRM was frequently called to the failure of ICAC to prosecute and convict the ‘big fish’. ICAC was also often accused of timidity and bias because of its failure to take action against some people for fear of being accused of ethnic or religious bias. 580. In its defence, ICAC pointed to a number of constraints. They include: (i) the time it takes to investigate cases; (ii) its inability to initiate prosecutions without the approval of the DPP; and (iii) the problem it has in getting credible evidence to justify prosecution and get convictions. Whistle-blowers often wish to remain anonymous, fail to appear in court to give evidence or change their testimony when they appear in court because of fear and intimidation. 581. In summary, the public expects ICAC to prosecute and convict corrupt people quickly, especially the ‘big fish’. Its failure to do so is at the heart of the perception that it is ineffective and does not go after highly placed and well-connected people suspected of corruption. Whether the explanation and justification ICAC gives, as to why its rate of prosecution and conviction of people accused of corruption is low, has merit or not, corrective measures are necessary. Among them are greater authority to initiate prosecutions, better protection of whistleblowers to encourage people to report and testify in corruption cases, and more resources to accelerate investigations of corruption. Another issue is sustaining the interest of the media and the public at large in matters of corruption. It would seem that, at present, the media and the public are only interested in corruption for short periods and when there are sensational cases. This may be because of cynicism about the outcomes of these cases. Whatever the reason, things need to change. It is only through sustained media coverage of these cases that the public will know what is being done and be empowered to hold the government accountable for the vigorous enforcement of the policy on corruption. 582. The CRM identified a major shortcoming in the functioning of ICAC. It has to do with following up on its recommendations. It would seem that there is no formal institutional arrangement for the appropriate authorities to consider reports of ICAC formally in order to act on its findings and recommendations. 219