to handle complaints and disputes arising from the electoral process. According to the report, these mechanisms include the requirement for NEBE to establish a Joint Forum at every level for political parties to resolve election disputes through dialogue, provide polling station and constituency grievance hearing committees, and offer recourse to the courts. Extent and Effectiveness of Decentralisation 145. On decentralisation, the CSAR notes that, although the country is one of Africa’s oldest states, Ethiopia has limited experience in decentralised governance and administration. For much of its constitutional and political history, Ethiopia was a highly centralised polity, leaving little responsibility and authority to subnational levels of administration. In this respect, the report observes that the 1991 assumption of power by the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) - under the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Forces (EPRDF) foreshadowed the end of the centralised state. It signalled the initial process of designing and structuring a decentralised federal state, made up of the federal government, regional state governments, weredas - below the regions - to serve as basic units of governance and development, and rural and urban kebele administrations – the lowest layer of administration - to promote participatory grassroots-based governance and development. This decentralised federal structure, according to the report, was anchored on two fundamental objectives: (a) to provide a level field for the equality of all ‘nations, nationalities, and peoples’; and (b) to ensure fair and equitable socio-economic progress for all the people of the country. 146. The CSAR concludes that, although decentralisation has, to a considerable extent, devolved power and resources from central to local levels - thereby empowering citizens to participate in policy-making processes at all levels in Ethiopia - a number of challenges remain. Notably, cumbersome structures and processes for procurement of goods and services; endemic staff and skill shortages; weak decision-making systems and inadequate organisational structures at different levels; and, institutional capacity constraints in formulating and implementing policies and programmes. Security Services, Rule of Law and Civilian Oversight 147. According to the CSAR, the Constitution enjoins and requires the security services, like other organs of the state and their officials, not only to ensure the observance of, and obedience to, the Constitution, but also to respect and enforce the constitutional provisions guaranteeing the fundamental rights and - 83 -