OBJECTIVE 4: i. UPHOLD THE SEPARATION OF POWERS, INCLUDING THE PROTECTION OF THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY Summary of the CSAR The executive 262. The most significant challenge to the entrenchment of separation of powers is the executive’s dominance over the judiciary and legislature. The culture of executive dominance has been carried over from military to civil rule, and it appears to have been consolidated during the emergence of a strong and influential presidency (1999–2007). There is some degree of executive influence in the selection of legislative leadership. The executive appoints officials of the top echelons of the judiciary. The judiciary 102 263. The president appoints the chief justice, the president of the Court of Appeal, the chief judge of the Federal High Court and the chief judge of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), subject to confirmation by the Senate. The president also appoints the Grand Kadhi of the Sharia Court of Appeal of the FCT and the president of the Customary Court of Appeal. The National Judicial Council advises the president on appointments to the federal courts. Governors appoint the chief judges, other judges of the state high courts, the Kadhi of the Sharia courts of appeal of the state courts, and the president of the customary courts of appeal of the states, upon the advice of the houses of assembly of the states. 264. The CSAR notes that the constitution guarantees judicial independence and gives the courts the power of judicial review. While the constitution calls and provides for judicial independence, in practice this provision has been frustrated by the executive control of funds at federal level. In particular, the constitutional requirement that judges be paid directly from the Federation Account has been frustrated by the executive, which at times is alleged to be reluctant to relinquish its control of these funds. At the state court levels, the governors control the subsistence and housing allowances of judges, who can only be promoted at the pleasure of the governors. Under such conditions, the constitutional requirement of judicial independence has remained mainly theoretical. 265. Lack of resources frequently means that judicial processes move very slowly, especially at the magistrate and lower court levels. Judges’ integrity will continue to be threatened by both corruption and political manipulation as long as the judiciary is poorly funded and the executive branch controls their operating budget. Exacerbated by corruption and inefficiency, the slow administration of justice often leads to a denial of due process and prolonged periods of pretrial detention. 266. Since the return to democratic rule in Nigeria in 1999, the judiciary has been able to demonstrate its independence and competence in landmark