CHAPTER TWO: HISTORICAL CONTEXT AND CURRENT CHALLENGES __________________________________________________________________________ The National and Sovereign Conference of the Bone and Sinew of the Nation, held in Cotonou between 19 and 28 February 1990, was certainly the peak of Benin’s transitional process. It was then that the nation decided to change. Within only 10 days, this institution of a new kind in Africa caused a profound upheaval of the political life and conceptions in the country. Indeed, the 493 delegates from both opposition and government circles agreed to lay the foundations for a new order. First, the conference suspended the 1977 Marxist-Leninist constitution and entrusted the task of drafting a new constitution to a committee of jurists, which was submitted to popular referendum in December 1990. It then limited the powers of the president of the republic. President Mathieu Kérékou was retained but lost most of his power, including the defence portfolio. Transitional institutions were created, among them the post of prime minister (entrusted by a vast majority vote to Nicéphore Soglo, who was later elected president of the republic) and a legislative body, the HCR. The HCR comprised the 13 members of the Presidium of the Conference; former presidents of the republic; the three chairpersons of the constitutional, economic and cultural committees; six delegates from the provinces; and 25 elected members. A multiparty presidential election was organised for March 1991. Defeated in the second round by Nicéphore Soglo, Mathieu Kérékou accepted his defeat but came back to power, five years later, through the ballot box. Hence, through its decisions, the National Sovereign Conference had a considerable impact. It ushered in a new regime and established a new political system. Many African countries followed Benin’s example. These include Burkina Faso, CongoBrazzaville, Gabon, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, Togo and Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo). However, none of the other national conferences was as successful as that of Benin, in terms of both its efficiency and the scope of the decisions adopted. 91. However, the large number of ethnic and regional political parties (approximately 150) and the unreliability of electoral lists and CENA (among other problems) are in danger of weakening Benin’s democracy. If, for some actors, “freedom cannot be cut up”, many Beninese are questioning the opportunities provided by, and the efficiency of, Benin’s multiparty system. They argue that it favours personal ambitions more than the interests of the country as a whole. Political parties are, in reality, “political enterprises” – machines created to produce political “gains” as well as economic and financial benefits for their founders and active members. 92. Suffering from an inadequate workforce in certain spheres (the education and health sectors, for example), Benin’s administrative productivity is low. The efficiency of public administration and its capacity to provide a responsible public service and to implement developmental policies and programmes remains a major challenge in consolidating democracy and in developing Benin. Fully cognisant of the situation, the government’s developmental policy proposes to repair the entire administration through the effective implementation of a series of reforms. The stated objective is to transform the administration into a modern ‘development administration’ in response to the needs of an emerging Benin. 93. The poor capacity of Benin’s legal system, in terms of both access and efficacy, is another major issue of concern. Indeed, despite the relative 55