which the first plaintiff could not have given informed consent in the sense referred to by the authorities (supra). [70] Dr Kimberg testified that one of the factors which should be taken into account in reaching informed consent is for a patient to be aware of and be able to evaluate alternative options available after having been duly informed of such alternatives. In this regard it would appear to me that where sterilisation, as one of the methods of contraception, is considered the patient should be informed of advantages and disadvantages of alternative contraception methods. This in my view would enable such a patient to truly make an informed decision. In respect of the second plaintiff Dr Gurirab who testified that he would have explained what a caesarean section was to the second plaintiff including the advantages and disadvantages, conceded that such explanation was not reflected in the ante-natal care record. He also conceded during cross-examination that there was no inscription on the passport that alternatives to sterilisation had been explained to the second plaintiff. It should in my view be accepted (as testified by Dr Gurirab) that he did not raise the issue of sterilisation with the second plaintiff. In view of an inscription on the medical record of the plaintiff it is likely that the 36 doctor who performed the caesarean on the plaintiff, raised the issue of sterilisation with the plaintiff. Nurse Ndjala who testified that she would have explained to the plaintiff that plaintiff was to be sterilised significantly testified that the consent was given by the plaintiff while she was in labour. She also assumed that the plaintiff wanted to be sterilised in view of an inscription on the ante-natal care record and that it was not necessary to counsel her again. Nurse Ndjala also significantly testified that she would have given the explanation to the plaintiff during intervals when there were no contractions. She also admitted that the instruction which was given to her on 9 December 2007 by the doctor, according to the notes recorded on the maternity record, was to prepare the plaintiff for a caesarean section only, there being no reference to a sterilisation. This was another example of consent being obtained from the plaintiff by a health official professional under circumstances where the patient was in the height of labour. Dr de Klerk conceded that the inscription on the ante-natal record made by herself would not necessarily be read as an accepted option by the plaintiff. Dr de Klerk also accepted that the fact that the plaintiff may have opted for sterilisation as a family planning method cannot be relied on for purposes of claiming that plaintiff had given her informed consent to the sterilisation procedure. Dr de Klerk when asked if she had been the surgeon performing the sterilisation procedure would she have been satisfied if a patient signed a consent form at their discussion, stated that she would not have been satisfied [71] Ms Schimming-Chase submitted that the second plaintiff’s version was unreliable since she had contradicted herself and that the testimony was not in line with various inscriptions on her health passport and differ markedly from