333. Some of the speakers at the meeting narrated their experiences with executive interference at regional and district levels. Two cases point to the fact that while some members of the judiciary resist such interference, others capitulate to it. The first case was the Republic v. Iddi Mtegule, where the magistrate stood his ground against interference and intimidation by the Area Commissioner. The second case was James Bita v. Iddi Kamba, where the magistrate succumbed to executive branch pressures. He not only complied with the request of the Area Commissioner to transfer the case before him to the Village Council but also later wrote a routine judgment abiding by the decision of the Village Council. 334. Other instances of interference with the judiciary, especially during the long period of single-party dominance and one-party rule include (i) “side-stepping” or circumventing the judiciary, for example through the establishment of tribunals, such as the Anti-Economic Sabotage Tribunals or Administrative Tribunals; and, (ii) the insertion of “ouster clauses” into legislation, granting the executive and the legislature immunity from judicial review. [For details, see: Charles Peter Maina, “Independence of the Judiciary in Tanzania: Many Rivers to Cross”, http://kituochakatiba.org/ index 2.php?option-com__doc. 335. In respect of ouster clauses, the judiciary in Tanzania, in a series of cases, held that the clauses were not “judge proof,” in the following cases: (i) Mtenga v. University of Dar es Salaam; (ii) Mwanza Restaurant and Catering Association v. Mwanza Municipal Director; and (iii) Attorney-General v. Lohay Akonaay and Another. 336. Another form of interference with the independence of the judiciary has come from the legislature, illustrated earlier on in this chapter by reference to the constitutional issues raised in Julius Ishengoma Francis Ndyanabo v. the Attorney-General. The CRM was informed during its meeting with judicial officers that the decisions of the judiciary in striking out clauses of legislation that are not in conformity with the constitution, especially its judgment on independent candidates as in the Ndyanabo case, have not gone down well with the legislature. 337. During meeting of the CRM with members of the higher judiciary, the CRM was assured that, in matters before them, judges are not influenced by and do not receive directives from the executive branch. They reinforced this assurance by pointing to their faithful adherence to their Oath of Office and their professional Code of Conduct and Ethics, which they are sworn to uphold and defend as judicial officers. 338. However, they conceded that the public misperception of interference with the judiciary by the executive might have been fed by reports in the media - especially in the print media - that the judiciary was making overtures to the executive for resources to improve its work. 339. The administrative independence of the judiciary in Tanzania faces the challenge posed by its human and physical capacity gaps. For example, the CRM learnt during its meeting with judicial officers in Dar es Salaam that there are no district courts in 25 districts in the country. The CRM was also informed that in a number of districts, some courts were closed down for lack of space. The CRM was also told during the meeting that the ratio of judges to the population in the country is one judge to five hundred thousand people. The situation is made more serious by the fact that, although there is increasing litigation because of a greater awareness among the population of their rights, the judiciary has not been able to increase its capacity to cope with the attendant higher workload. This, therefore, creates problems of access to justice and the timely dispensation of cases and delivery of justice. 340. A major dimension of the administrative independence of the judiciary, featuring prominently in participants’ comments during the CRM meeting with the judiciary, was the discipline of magistrates. The CRM was informed of the total staff strength of the judiciary: 6,500. Participants were firm in their view that the executive and legislature should not be involved in the discipline of magistrates, in line with the separation of powers and the principle of the independence of the judiciary, also entrenched in the constitution. For this reason, they objected to the legislature playing a role in disciplining the lower judiciary and would like to see the judiciary given full powers to discipline its own members. They asserted that it would further insulate the judiciary from partisan interference by holders of elective and other public political office at regional, district, and local levels. 341. As stated in the CSAR, current practice holds that the the Judicial Service Special Commission disciplines primary court magistrates, in consent with the Minister of Justice who, in turn, acts through Regional Boards, on the recommendation of District Judicial Boards. 81