powers was not enshrined in [the country’s] …constitution, although it was implicit in the constitution’s diverse provisions…since independence.” Further constitutional amendments, “some extensively affecting balance of power among the branches of Government”, were enacted in 1992, 1993, 1994, 2000 and 2005. [CSAR, p.85] 310. According to the CSAR [p.85], the principle of separation of powers in Zanzibar is implied in Article 5A of Zanzibar’s Constitution, and it was not only under the 2002 eighth amendment to Zanzibar’s Constitution that “the doctrine was spelt out” in the constitution. 311. The CSAR [p. 85] points out that, “Tanzania has a history of having a very powerful executive” under the oneparty state, where “parliament was just a rubber stamp of the executive through the party and the judiciary was just a tool.”   Extent of separation of powers in Tanzania 312. The CSAR describes in detail the constitutional provisions defining the extent and limitations of the separation of powers as they relate to each of the executive, legislature, and judiciary [pp.87-104], since the onset of the multi-party system, while also drawing attention to conflicts among them. 313. However, the CSAR [p.85] concludes that, due to the residual effect of the history of one-party rule in the country and “by virtue of the existing constitution the executive is still very powerful and, thus, constraining the principle of separation of powers,” although “during the period of multi-party system there have been some improvement”. Notably, major constitutional amendments in 2000 that sought to affect and improve the balance of power among the three branches of Government by (i)“further reducing presidential powers,” especially “the list of presidential appointees”; (ii) granting the President the power to nominate up to ten members of Parliament, thereby “increasing his say in the legislature”; (iii) introducing the Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance; and (iv) “clearly stating that the judiciary will be free in discharging its duties …[ and pronouncing it] as the final authority vested with powers to dispense justice in the United Republic.” Separation of functionaries of the three branches 314. The CSAR [p.88] stresses that at the core of the separation of powers between the three branches of Government in the URT and Zanzibar is the separation of their functionaries. This means that when a Member of Parliament is elected as President or appointed as Vice President of the URT and Zanzibar, he or she is required to vacate his/ her seat in Parliament [Article 71(1) (b) and (e) of the URT Constitution for URP, and for Zanzibar, Article 71(b) of the Constitution of Zanzibar. Similarly, under Article 67(2) of the Constitution of the URT, persons holding senior office in the service of the URT, except the Attorney General, shall not qualify for election or be appointed a Member of Parliament. Furthermore, all MPs in the URT and Zanzibar are ineligible for appointment as members of the National Electoral Commission, and are barred from appointment as members of the Judicial Service Commission [Article 112(3) of the URT Constitution, and Article 102(2) of the Zanzibar Constitution]. Extent of the independence of the judiciary 315. According to the CSAR, the 1977 URT Constitution stipulates that the judiciary shall be the final authority in dispensing justice and adjudication of rights in Tanzania; and that in so doing, the judiciary shall be free and take into consideration only the provisions of the constitution and other laws. The judiciary is made up of: (i) the higher judiciary, namely, the Court of Appeal of Tanzania, over which the Chief Justice presides, and the High Court of Tanzania, which is spread over several zones in the country; (ii) the Courts of Resident Magistrates; (iii) the District Courts; and, (iv) the Primary Courts. 316. There is a Judicial Service Commission, comprising the Chief Justice as Chairman, the Attorney-General, the Principal Judge of the High Court - who are members by virtue of their offices - and one judge of the Court of Appeal, and two other members, who are appointed by the President. 317. Although appointed by the President, the judges of the Court of Appeal and the High Court have “secure tenure,” in that they can only be removed for “inability to perform their functions or for misbehaviour,” after 78