211. The CRM found out that there was a general consensus among the stakeholders at the CRM meetings across the country that the post-1996 local Government reform was initially democratic and geared towards autonomy. The reform was responsive to citizens’ demands, through elective representation, especially during its first phase. However many stakeholders also claimed that limited gains and successes were adversely affected by a number of factors. 212. The CRM was informed at these regional stakeholder meetings that the country’s 133 Local Government Authorities have had to cope with onerous and constraining human resource and financial capacity problems. On the human resource capacity issue, stakeholders identified a lack of accountants, auditors and lawyers at the local level. With regard to financial capacity, the problem was ascribed to the central government transfers that reduced the local revenue and tax-collecting base. 213. On this last point, the CRM learnt that: (i) in several cases, central Government was yet to fulfill its promise to compensate local Government authorities for revenue lost through reallocating revenue collected from the local level; (ii) allocations to local Government authorities were inequitably distributed; (iii) local Government authorities’ allocations were not based on demand; (iv) local Government authorities were typically unable to balance their budgets; and (v) local Government block grants were generally insufficient to meet the local Government authority budgetary needs. 214. Some stakeholders observed that rather than being a re-centralisation issue, human resource capacity constraints caused by the inability of most local authorities to collect even half of the tax collectibles still within their power to collect was the basic problem. 215. The CRM found out that other areas where there were challenges for full devolution to local Government authorities include (i) a lack of professionalism at the local Government level; (ii) the need to improve social infrastructure such as water, roads, and health facilities for more effective service delivery; (iii) local Government staff training; (iv) rural development and improvement programmes; and, (v) introducing performance indicators. Regarding corruption, one participant at the CRM stakeholders’ meeting in Arusha observed that some local councillors were often corrupt because they were victims of cultural pressures imposed by their constituents seeking monetary support to pay [constituents’] children’s school fees, organise funerals, weddings. A councillors’ Tsh. 500,000 monthly salary would barely be able to meet those and other expenses. 216. The CRM would like to point out that the logic of decentralisation should be applied to the regional level in Tanzania. This would correspond to global and African trends to devolve political power to multiple layers and centres of political authority on the basis of subsidiarity. Such an approach would, moreover, be in line with APRM DPG Objective Two where the emphasis is on political devolution. 217. The regional level is the missing link in the chain of political devolution in Tanzania. Indeed, as far back as 1969, a presidential commission had recommended devolution of powers to regional bodies. Their report was never published and the recommendation was rejected, apparently because of the political implications of increased regional autonomy. 218. Placing a layer of government at the regional level would have two strategic political advantages and benefits. First, it might take the steam off the long-standing agitation for a Government for Mainland Tanzania, by granting some level of autonomy and, therefore, self-rule, for each of the regions in Mainland Tanzania. Secondly, it would give legitimacy to elected leaders and representatives of the new devolved units of Government. At the moment, Regional Commissioners lack legitimacy and this tends to create political problems between Regional and District Commissioners. 219. Under the constitution, Regional Commissioners is not an elective office. Typically, ministers are appointed from the Union Parliament, but a Regional Commissioner is not a member. However, there is no constitutional provision that prevents the President from appointing a Member of Parliament a Regional Commissioner, or a Regional Commissioner a Member of Parliament. 62