174. The CRM notes that Tanzania has continued to make appreciable progress in promoting constitutionalism, the rule of law, and political pluralism. The country’s semi-presidential form of government has worked well so far because of the CCM’s electoral dominance and control of both the presidency and legislature. The acid test will, however, come either: (i) with more competitive party and electoral politics, which results in another party or coalition of parties in control either of the presidency or the legislature; or (ii) with the more determined assertion of its oversight and investigatory powers over the executive branch by the current CCM-controlled legislature. Recent disagreements between the executive and the legislature over the budget, the anti-corruption war, the extent of privatisation and indigenisation, and the constitutional review legislation seem to portend this eventuality. 175. However, much remains to be done to protect constitutionalism, the rule of law, and political pluralism in Tanzania. Allegations of abuse of human rights by state functionaries and agencies and of extra-judicial killings recurred at all the CRM stakeholders’ meetings in Dar es Salaam and in the regions. Specifically, in April 2003 police were alleged to have shot and killed a small-scale miner and in 2006, four suspected bandits were allegedly killed by the police at Sinza. 176. The abridged version of the CHRAGG annual report (for the period July 2008 to June 2009 [p.39]) recounts the following human rights’ abuses: (i) “widely reported cases” of extra-judicial killings, particularly killings of albinos; (ii) reports of mob justice in regions visited by CHRAGG staff; and, (iii) the case of three businessmen allegedly killed by the police under the leadership of the Dar es Salaam Regional Crime Officer. The report [page 50] attributes the prevalence of the abuses to “inadequacies in advocacy for systems changes in human rights education and in reaching the grassroots and the most vulnerable.” 177. During stakeholders’ meetings across Tanzania, the CRM learnt from participants that mob justice or mob lynching constitutes an increscent gross violation of human rights by citizens. The speakers attributed mob justice to the general public’s ignorance and misconceptions about the justice system. The general perspective for the public as a whole tends to be that the accused or suspected person - the victim of mob justice - is guilty and must be punished accordingly, without recourse to the due process of the law and its presumption that the accused person is innocent until found guilty beyond all reasonable doubt. The recourse to mob justice, is therefore, linked to the public perception of justice delivery. 178. It seems as if the public is generally ignorant about the rights of the accused and the requirements of due process. The stakeholders expressed the need for the state authorities to mount more vigorous efforts, such as: (i) the prosecution of culpable state functionaries and members of the public; and (ii) human rights education for police and state security agencies, and iii) for the general public, to prevent the recurrence of police brutality and extra-judicial killings. 179. Various stakeholders consulted by the CRM emphasized the need to minimize routine use of the claw-back clauses in Article 30 and Article 31 of the 1977 Constitution to derogate from the human rights and freedoms set out in the Constitution. The CRM agrees with these stakeholders that legislative action be expedited to pass the Freedom of Information and Media Services Bill into law. 180. Regarding the rule of law and separation of powers, the CRM notes with concern the serious implications for the rule of law of the following observations from its stakeholder meetings across the URT. During such meetings in Dar es Salaam, many speakers alleged that court judgments on the eligibility of independent candidates to run for elections had, on a number of instances (such as the Rev. Mtikila cases), pitted the judiciary against the executive and the legislature. On the other hand, some speakers observed that regional and district commissioners were – from the recent history of the behaviour of executive branch functionaries - the most likely to disobey court orders. In a number of cases, the speakers also pointed out, the regional and district commissioners in question had been called to order by the highest levels of the executive branch. 181. The CRM notes with concern that there are few horizontal and independent democracy-promoting institutions in Tanzania. These institutions currently include CHRAGG, the Combating and Prevention of Corruption Bureau (PCCB), the Ethics Secretariat, NEC, and the Registrar of Political Parties, all of which operate under severe constraints and limitations. 55