l. Findings of the CRM Separation of powers in Tanzania 325. The principle of the separation of powers, supplemented by constitutional provisions for checks and balances, exists to prevent the concentration of powers in one branch of government. It provides countervailing powers to check the arbitrary use of their limited power by the branches of government. It is, in this sense, a core requirement of a constitutional government and the rule of law in a democracy: a legal system where laws and not men rule. 326. The CRM notes that, during the long years of the single-party domination and one party rule (1961-1992), Tanzania experienced executive branch and party dominance. The dominance persists under the current multiparty rule, in spite of constitutional provisions for the separation of powers. 327. Referring to the vast arsenal of power in the presidency, President Julius Nyerere once asserted that, “the [Tanzanian] constitution gives me enough powers to be a dictator.” If the presidents of Tanzania have not become “dictators” in spite of the huge powers of the presidency, it is partly because of the country’s political culture, which has given rise to social forces to moderate, check and balance the exercise of power.   Extent of the independence of the judiciary 328. The CRM finds it useful to examine the extent to which the judiciary is independent, at three levels: (i) independence to make judgments and undertake judicial review - without undue interference, and to have the judgments and review respected and enforced; (ii) administrative independence, especially in appointments, promotions and discipline; and, (iii) financial independence. 329. Cutting across these levels is the ethical question posed for the judiciary by the general perception that corruption is the bane of the lower judiciary. Nonetheless, the extent to which independence is asserted at each of these levels must be assessed in the broader context of the scope and degree of professionalism on the Bench. Other contextual factors are: (i) the country’s political economy; (ii) its socio-cultural environment; and, (iii) its governance structure and processes - corruption, harassment of judicial personnel, and involvement of the ruling party in appointment and disciplinary processes within the judiciary that might undermine judicial independence. 330. It transpired during the CRM meeting with the judiciary in Dar es Salaam that the judiciary enjoys a great deal of functional independence: primarily due to modalities and processes specified in the constitution for the appointment, tenure, removal, and discipline of judicial office-holders, from the Court of Appeal down to the primary courts. 331. The constitutional provision under Article 110(3)(b) that the Chairman and at least half of the other members of the Special Tribunal - set up by the President to consider whether a Judge shall be removed from office must be judges of the High Court or Justices of Appeal from any Commonwealth Country is a commendable practice. However, the fact that there are no constitutional provisions to secure the tenure of the Chief Justice and the Principal judge, making it possible for the President to remove them without cause, need to be reviewed. Regardless of the fact that this does buttress the need for security of tenure, it is noteworthy that no President has ever exercised such overwelming powers of removal. 332. More troubling threats to the independence of the judiciary are posed by the harassment of judicial officers and interference with the work of the judiciary. Interference sometimes takes the form of disregard, non-enforcement, and the circumvention of judicial judgments, especially by executive branch functionaries. Although harassment and interference with the work of the judiciary is rare and, indeed, uncommon at the level of the country’s higher judiciary, the CRM was informed at a meeting with judicial officers in Dar es Salaam that interference has been a common occurrence at the magistrate, district, and primary court level. The degree of interference led to a consensus of opinion at the meeting on the need for disciplinary action against judicial officers to be left entirely in the hands of the judiciary in order to safeguard the independence of the judiciary This point is further discussed later in this section. 80