Page 11 Council after Morocco ignored the Settlement Plan, and approved under the UN Security Council Resolution 1495 (2003), agrees in its contents with the Settlement Plan. It stipulates that after four to five years of self-government, a referendum open to Sahrawis and Moroccans residing in the region, should be conducted in December 1991. 28. In addition, as there have been only two options from the onset, joining Morocco or independence, to be decided upon through a referendum, Mr. Baker added a third option, self-governance under Moroccan sovereignty to provide more guarantees for the kingdom of Morocco and to encourage it to accept the Plan. 29. All these efforts were to no avail as Morocco rejected the Peace Plan like it did the Huston Settlement Accords it initially accepted and signed formally. 30. As stated earlier, since its endorsement of the UN /OAU Settlement Plan, Morocco has embarked on a fierce campaign aimed at stifling efforts of the UN Identification Committee which was seized with the preparation of the Sahrawi voters list in implementation of its mandate, by casting doubts consistently on the criteria for the identification of voters and by intimidating members of the Committee and increasing the number of its requests. It eventually succeeded in freezing the activities of the said Committee constantly. 31. James Baker, therefore, had stretched his imagination, through the Huston Accords, to revive the identification processes in addition to the determination and persistence shown by members of the Identification Committee to complete their work and release the temporary voter list by the end of 1999. 32. As the referendum becomes inevitable, with all the conditions having been completed, Morocco declared that the Settlement Plan could not be implemented. 33. Instead of forcing Morocco to stick to its commitments, the UN Security Council asked Mr. James Baker to look for a political solution that would guarantee selfdetermination for the people of Western Sahara.