CHAPTER THREE: DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL GOVERNANCE _____________________________________________________________________ rules of the electoral process, in delays in putting structures into place, and in much guesswork or improvisations vitiating the credibility of the electoral process. Generally, however, CENI has contributed to the credibility of elections. Recently, a single ballot and transparent ballot boxes have been introduced. As a result, there has been an increase in the rate of voter participation, with such participation reaching records of 64% and 60% of the number of registered voters in 2002 and 2005 respectively. This has also contributed to the reduction in the number of electoral disputes. However, criticism has been expressed regarding the rigor, probity and competence of some members of CENI or its branches, with some members being suspected, rightly or wrongly, of corruption. Indeed, the fragility of CENI’s status (introduced by a simple law), the strong prevalence of parties, and CENI’s financial dependence on the state and its corresponding lack of control over its budget are real constraints to the optimal operation of the electoral system and are matters calling for institutional reforms. The constitutionalisation of a restructured CENI that enjoys an organically, functionally and financially strengthened autonomy is something that would be welcomed. Such restructuring could take a dual form. There could be a supervisory umbrella body comprising a small and odd number of individuals with an established reputation and moral authority who are appointed by the president of Burkina Faso on the basis of a consensus proposal by the political class. This body could chair a technical structure that includes a core of permanent professionals, electoral executives and technicians who are recruited by tender and who are spread between the headquarters and the branches of CENI, with the aim being to ensure practical implementation of electoral specifications. 176. Several changes to the electoral code and to electoral divisions have undoubtedly contributed to greater consensus regarding the rules of the electoral process for legislative and local elections. From 1991 to 2002, seven changes or amendments were made. These included three versions of the electoral code from 2000 to 2002. The 2004 version of the code has significantly changed the rules of the game as far as electoral distribution, the breakdown of seats and the mode of voting are concerned. 177. However, the proportionality of the ballot and the influence of national lists – benefits enjoyed mainly by the opposition – have been questioned to some extent. The move from the region to the province as the legislative basis for an electoral constituency has resulted in about 15 districts, thereby transforming proportional representation into a de facto majority ballot. Each one of these 15 districts has only one seat to be filled, while the number of seats varies from two to nine in the other provinces. 178. These changes, which partly accompanied the collapse of the opposition during the last legislative term, are seen by many players and observers as the point of departure for questioning the achievements in terms of electoral matters. As a result, there is currently a crisis of confidence between the opposition and the presidential movement. Many stakeholders have called for the return to a more equitable, more consensual and more representative system of political diversity for Burkina Faso, a call to which the public seems to be sensitive. 179. The presidential election is conducted on the basis of a majority vote in two rounds, with the voting method being agreed upon by way of consensus. The 101