Economic Governance and Management 583. 584. 585. 220 Chapter 4 When asked about this, the director of ICAC responded by stating that the legislation that established ICAC does not provide a mechanism to follow up on its reports. This is not a good explanation for failing to follow up, as any gap and shortcoming in the legislation could be corrected easily if there is the political will to do so. Consideration should therefore be given to creating a mechanism for discussing and following up the reports of ICAC. It could happen at the highest levels of government, like the Council of Ministers, a committee of Parliament or the full Parliament itself. All this requires is the necessary commitment, at the highest level, to strengthen ICAC and the fight against corruption. The fact that this step has not been taken leads the CRM to conclude that the perception among key stakeholders that corruption is prevalent and that the political authorities lack enthusiasm about the fight against corruption, especially in high places, has a great deal of credence. The CRM believes that the fact that Parliament has failed to pursue the reports of ICAC energetically raises serious questions about its capacity and effectiveness in exercising control and oversight in the management of public finances. It should be noted that this shortcoming applies equally to the reports of the FSC and the FIU. The reports of the NAO are referred to the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) of Parliament. It then submits its reports to the speaker of the National Assembly. However, these reports are not debated by Parliament as a whole. At present, the reports of ICAC are tabled in Parliament. However, they are not referred to any parliamentary committee, such as the PAC, for detailed examination, nor are they discussed by Parliament as a whole. According to parliamentary rules, it is possible for Parliament to pass a motion to discuss the reports of ICAC, the FIU and the FSC, but the CRM learnt that this is extremely rare. Questions could also be asked about these reports during question time, during the general debate on the economic programme of the government at the opening of Parliament, during the debate on the budget, and when Parliament adjourns. The CRM is not convinced that the existing arrangements for Parliament to oversee the reports of ICAC are adequate. The arguments by the speaker of the National Assembly that there are few standing committees in Parliament to examine these reports and that there are opportunities for members of Parliament (MPs) to raise questions about them, are not persuasive. Given that the party that controls the executive branch of government also controls Parliament, and that the executive is almost never defeated in Parliament, the CRM is left with the impression that Parliament’s failure to take effective Chapter 4 Economic Governance and Management measures to discuss ICAC reports reflects the lack of commitment of political leaders to fight corruption. 586. However, it should be noted that ICAC is actively engaged in conducting Corruption Prevention Reviews (CPRs). These are indepth studies of the systems and procedures of public institutions for identifying weaknesses that may create opportunities for corruption. ICAC conducted five CPRs in 2007/2008. ICAC sent them to the respective institutions. These involved: the Civil Status Division of the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO); the tender for supplying tiles to the Ministry of Education, Culture and Human Resources (MECHR); the management of parent-teachers associations; the allocation of state lands in Rodrigues; and the issuing of building and land-use permits by local authorities. In addition, two draft CPRs, on integrity in the Construction Sector Wastewater Management Authority (WMA) and on improving controls in information technology operations in the public sector, were prepared and submitted. CPRs are being prepared that deal with: (i) the National Development Unit; (ii) the Ministry of Health and Quality of Life (MoHQL); (iii) the National Housing Development Company (NHDC); (iv) the Grande-Port Savanne District Council; (v) the Sugar Planters Mechanical Pool Corporation; (vi) the Ministry of Social Security, National Solidarity and Senior Citizens Welfare and Reform Institutions; (vii) the MPF; (viii) the Ministry of Agro-Industry and Fisheries; and (ix) the Commission for Agriculture, Natural Resources, Rehabilitation and Water Resources (Rodrigues). This is evidently a very important effort by ICAC, and its activities cover a number of important ministries and agencies. 587. ICAC tries to go beyond preparing and submitting CPRs. It also follows up to assess the implementation of its recommendations. It conducted six follow-up exercises in 2007/2008. These showed that, in most cases, the recommendations were not implemented. Thus, the implementation rate for their recommendations was: (i) 31 per cent for the Ministry of Industry, Science and Research, SMEs, commerce and cooperatives; (ii) 65 per cent for the Mauritius Duty Free Paradise; (iii) 8 per cent for the Ministry of Women’s Rights, Child Development and Family Welfare (MWRCDFW); (iv) 38 per cent for the Ministry of Housing and Lands; (v) 36 per cent for the National Transport Authority; and (vi) 39 per cent for the Commission for Public Infrastructure and others in Rodrigues. The percentages for recommendations in the process of being implemented are 18 per cent, 28 per cent, 16 per cent, 29 per cent, 15 per cent and 14 per cent respectively. These percentages are on the low side, but they 221