(2018) 2 African Human Rights Yearbook 61 Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Judge Trindade powerfully declared: Human nature being what it is, systematic oppression has again occurred, in distinct contexts; hence the recurring need, and right, of people to be free from it. … [P]eople cannot be targeted for atrocities, cannot live under systematic oppression. The principle of self -determination applies in new situations of systematic oppression, subjugation and tyranny.43 The African Commission itself, in a welcome show of progressive thinking, was the first human rights body to adumbrate a possible right of remedial secession. In Katanga, the Commission held (para 6): In the absence of concrete evidence of violations of human rights to the point that the territorial integrity of Zaire should be called to question and in the absence of evidence that the people of Katanga are denied the right to participate in Government as guaranteed by Article 13(1) of the African Charter, the Commission holds the view that Katanga is obliged to exercise a variant of self-determination that is compatible with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Zaire. The legal a contrario logic in this passage essentially reflects the Declaration on the Principles of International Law. The Declaration is regarded as an authoritative interpretation of the UN Charter and supports the argument for remedial secession. So why does the Commission systematically decline external selfdetermination claims? The reason for this paradox seems to be that ‘the case law of the African Commission on a remedial right to secession functions there more to bolster a weak regional human rights system rather than to give legal effect to the right to self-determination’ and that the Commission’s ‘obsession with a territorial reading of the right to self-determination confuses right and legal effect.’44 Furthermore, the attitude of the Commission reflects anxieties about a continent in permanent conflict. The Commission fears that a broad recognition of the right to self-determination of African peoples would result in further weakening of admittedly fragile African countries and probably leading to the disintegration of African states. This point was made in Frontier Dispute case,45 where the ICJ argued that uti possidetis has a particular importance in Africa as it seeks to prevent newly independent African states from ‘fratricidal struggles provoked by the challenging of frontiers following the withdrawal of the administering power’. But a less pessimistic view holds, in the context of internal selfdetermination, that recognising the rights of Africa’s many peoples ‘could lead to more democratic, decentralised governments, thereby enhancing local decision making and respect for human rights within existing states, and strengthening them in the long run.’46 42 43 44 45 46 Emory International Law Review 479; V Nanda ‘Self-determination under international law: Validity of claims to secede’ (1981) 13 Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 257; J Klabbers ‘The right to be taken seriously: self-determination in international law’ (2006) 28 Human Rights Quarterly 186. Accordance with international law of the unilateral declaration of independence in respect of Kosovo Advisory Opinion (Kosovo Advisory Opinion) ICJ (22 July 2010) (2010) ICJ Reports Separate Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade para 175. Salomon (n 39). Case concerning the frontier dispute (Burkina Faso v Mali) (Frontier Dispute) ICJ (22 December 1986) (1986) ICJ Reports 554. Salomon (n 39).