128 Kabumba/Application of African Union (human rights) law in Uganda is whether a given international obligation addresses the state with respect to its actions towards other states, i.e. whether it prescribes or proscribes certain conduct exclusively on the international level, or whether it addresses the state with respect to taking certain conduct or guaranteeing certain results within its domestic jurisdiction. In the former instance the international obligation is ‘extrovert’ or ‘outward-looking’: it addresses the state in its conduct on the international level towards other states. In the latter it is ‘introvert’ or ‘inward- looking’, it mandates conduct within the domestic jurisdiction. The prohibition of the use of force and the prohibition of intervention are obvious examples of outward-looking obligations, while obligations under human rights law, or under the law of immunity, are inward-looking obligations.252 In this regard, the fact that a significant number of obligations under AU law are directed towards Uganda’s conduct on the international plane may explain the relatively limited presence of this body of law in the jurisprudence of Ugandan courts. This is also a convincing explanation for the predominance of AU human rights law in Ugandan judicial decisions, since those obligations are quintessentially ‘inwardlooking’.253 This further explains the relatively strong showing of EAC law, a great degree of whose obligations are directed towards changing the domestic landscape in member states in a range of fields (ranging from free movement of goods to free movement of persons).254 Secondly, few Ugandan law schools, if any, teach ‘Integration Law’ as a distinct area – much less ‘AU Law’. This reality is also reflected in scholarship – with no Ugandan-authored book on AU law.255 On the other hand, AU human rights law seems to have had more traction – perhaps because it is usually a standard staple of international human rights law courses. Similarly, there are a great number of EU law courses across the world, which Ugandan Judges might have undertaken in the course of post-graduate studies. The sheer volume of EU-focused legal texts, widely available in Uganda, as well as EUsupported capacity building courses for lawyers and Judges,256 might 252 253 254 255 256 Tzanakopoulos (n 251) 158. Even then, as Viljoen has pointed out, there are a number of instances where AU human rights law could have been referred to, and applied, by Ugandan courts but where this did not happen. He cites, for instance, the decision of the Constitutional Court in Salvatori Abuki and Another v Attorney General Constitutional Case No.2 of 1997, which invalidated parts of the Witchcraft Act as being inconsistent with the constitutional guarantees relating to freedom from cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment. As he rightly notes, the Court could have referred to the African Charter, which contains a similar protection - see Viljoen (n 3) 542. In addition, from this perspective, a sub-regional court with competence over both commercial disputes and human rights matters might be viewed as wielding a degree of influence – in the domestic plane – with which states might be uncomfortable. This might explain the poor fortunes of the SADC Tribunal, as well as why initiatives to clothe the EACJ with a human rights mandate seem to have stalled. By contrast, there is a written text on EAC law by a prominent Ugandan legal scholar – see Ssempebwa (n 3). See, for instance, J Arutu ‘The recent judicial reforms in Uganda with emphasis on “ADR and mediation”’ Paper presented to the 3rd Magistrates and Registrars’ Conference, 2012 https://www.jlos.go.ug/index.php/document-centre/media tion/258-recent-judicial-reforms-in-uganda-emphasis-on-alternative-dispute-res olution-adr-and-mediation/file (accessed 15 January 2019) at 1 (‘Mediation has been an integral part of the Commercial Court Division since 2003 when it was piloted for a period of two