(2018) 2 African Human Rights Yearbook 103 In the Mulago case,74 Judge Mugambe felt that an evaluation of the right to health ‘[could not] be complete without a discussion of the internationally accepted ideas of the various duties or obligations engendered by it as an economic, social and cultural right’.75 She then cited the African Commission’s findings in Social and Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) and Centre for Economic and Social Rights (CESR) v. Nigeria76 as authority for various propositions regarding the nature and scope of the right to health in Uganda, and the state’s obligations in this regard.77 Judge Mugambe further made reference,78 in the same context, to the Commission’s decision in Purohit and Moore v The Gambia.79 After this extensive review, the Judge concluded that: ‘[c]learly the notion of progressive realization within available resources must not be viewed as an excuse to defeat or deny economic, social and cultural rights like the right to health’. Ultimately, the Judge found the defendants to have violated a number of constitutional provisions, and stipulated several wide ranging specific and structural remedial orders. Similarly, in the CEHURD and Iga case,80 the Constitutional Court made extensive reference to the African Commission’s decision in Purohit81 in finding a range of expressions and terms in statutory law to be inconsistent with the rights of persons with intellectual and psychosocial disabilities to dignity (under article 24 of the Constitution). The Justices of the Constitutional Court expressly stated that they had ‘drawn inspiration from’82 the Purohit case, and especially the Commission’s determination that the right to human dignity was to be enjoyed by all persons, including persons with intellectual or psychosocial disabilities, without discrimination of any kind.83 The Court noted that the Purohit decision was consistent with, and based upon, the Commission’s previous decisions in Media Rights Agenda v Nigeria and John K. Modise v Botswana – relating to freedom from torture and the right to human dignity.84 The Court also felt that the Purohit decision was ‘a persuasive authority’ in so far as it construed a provision of a Gambian statute which was similar to section 45(5) of the Trial Indictments Act of Uganda, one of the statutes challenged before the Court.85 The Court also later drew upon Purohit with regard to the right to liberty – in the context of the involuntary detention of persons with intellectual or psychosocial disabilities – again noting that the Purohit reasoning in this respect was ‘persuasive’ 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 n 50. At para 19. Communication 155/96. See paras 19-32. At para 33. Communication 241 of 2001 (2003). n 35. n 79. At 16. At 17. As above. As above.