CHAPTER THREE: DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL GOVERNANCE 232. The Higher Council of the Magistracy consists of a majority of judges elected by their peers, so as to guarantee their independence, while independent figures are appointed by the President of the Republic in order to counteract corporatism. The Higher Council has financial autonomy and is presided over by the First President of the Supreme Court when the court sits on disciplinary matters. 233. The twofold concern to strengthen judicial power and restore the confidence of citizens in the justice system justifies the significant reform process that has been undertaken since 2004. The number of judicial staff continues to be insufficient and their training should be improved to achieve greater efficiency of the independence of the justice system. 234. Insofar as the independence of the legislature and the effectiveness of the separation of powers are concerned, the parliament is independent organically and financially. Each chamber establishes its own internal regulation, adopts its budget on the recommendation of the parliamentary office, and pronounces directly on the indemnity of its members. 235. The government must have the confidence of the APN, which approves its programme and pronounces on the general policy statement of the head of government each year. The head of government may be the subject of a motion of no confidence. The practice of submitting written and oral questions is widespread and the government has already been called to account on several occasions. Several draft bills have been introduced by the APN and numerous amendments by the deputies, including the draft bills on finance that are subjected to rigorous scrutiny. The period for responses to parliamentary questions should, however, be shorter and parliamentary interpellations more generally made public. 236. The particular importance of the balance of powers in relation to the stability of the institutions needs to be emphasised, especially as regards the difficulties in implementing the separation of powers as a result of multi-partyism. The division of authority represented by the President of the Republic and the head of government could lead to conflict and problems in the event of differences in the presidential and parliamentary majorities, both the subject of universal suffrage. Consideration should also be given to the choice to be made between a presidential regime and a parliamentary regime. 237. The dual nature of the bicameral parliament in the fundamental law is also a potential source of conflict and institutional deadlock. The head of state is able to block any law adopted by the APN that he deems is contrary to republican principles through the National Council, a third of the members of which are appointed by the President of the Republic. 238. At another level, the function of the judicial council of the government, which is attributed to the Council of the State, the supreme administrative body that derives its authority ipso facto from the judicial authority, could encroach on the principle of the separation of powers. 85