are legion. This is not well covered in the CSAR, yet it is very important to the ordinary citizen whose life is impacted daily by the police. 316. Many stakeholders were not fully aware of the functions of the ICPC and the EFCC, especially at the state level. Some awareness does exist that there are corruption-fighting agencies, but the role of the citizen in helping these agencies to tackle corruption is not very clear. When asked about willingness to become ‘whistle-blowers’ against corrupt individuals, reactions were mixed. On a one-to-one basis, a few people expressed fear, others saw only futility in the exercise, while a few saw it as a betrayal of kith and kin. There is a general perception that whistle-blowers will not be fully protected ‘when push comes to shove’. 317. Generally, the EFCC is perceived in a more positive light than the ICPC. This is also revealed in some publications, including newspaper reportage. The high esteem in which the EFCC is held is said to be due to its committed leadership and fearless efforts in bringing to book high-profile personalities accused of corruption. 318. The CCB deals with asset declarations of public officials, with the ICPC and EFCC complementing its work. The penalty for making no declaration, or a false declaration, is draconian, as those found guilty can lose their legislative seats or be banned from holding one for 10 years, in addition to the forfeiture to the state of any property acquired through the abuse of office. However, the CCB lacks adequate means to ascertain the veracity of declared assets, and this often makes it impotent in dealing with legislators (in particular) who fail to declare their assets. 319. Very few stakeholders raised the issue of asset declaration and the immunity clause. The general impression gained was that asset declaration can be manipulated to the advantage of those who make the declaration. Expunging the immunity clause for political executives was viewed as futile, since their control of political power will counter the full effects of such a constitutional move. A small minority expressed the opinion that the immunity clause may be useful to protect the presidency and governors from unnecessary litigation while in office, thus allowing the incumbent to devote full attention to running the executive branch of government. 320. The civil service, including senior military and security officers, was mentioned as an example of a source of corruption in the CSAR. Stakeholders stated that civil service attitudes to public property and service delivery lacked moral principles and were devoid of the traditional values of respect for community assets. Strangely, people were most reluctant to discuss the military and, apart from newspaper reports, very little corruption was laid at the door of the military. This is contrary to the CSAR’s explicit assertion of corruption, especially in the ranks of the officer corps. 321. Other areas of corruption identified included the following: • Payroll fraud, especially in the civil service. • Impunity due to the operation of patron-client systems at the political level. 115