corruption, the National Judicial Council was quick to deal with such cases and made a big effort to weed out corruption in the judiciary. 275. The CRM found out that, while the constitution guarantees judicial independence and gives the courts the power of judicial review, in practice this provision has been frustrated by the executive control of funds at state and federal levels. In particular, the constitutional requirement in section 121 that judges be paid directly from the Federal Account has been frustrated by the executive, which is alleged to be reluctant at times to relinquish control of these funds. At the state court levels, governors control the subsistence and housing allowances of judges, whose promotion depends on the pleasure of the governors. Some governors even refuse to appoint the judges or chief justices nominated to serve in their states. 276. However, at the federal level, the judiciary has some independence in the appointment process owing to the involvement of the National Judicial Service Commission in the selection process. The president makes high-level appointments in the judiciary with the approval of the legislature. However, in performing the judicial function even in politically sensitive cases, judges have exercised their autonomy. 277. Stakeholders reiterated that constitutional provision for the separation of powers requires compliance with section 121 of the constitution, which secures the requirement that funds standing to the credit of the judiciary in the Consolidated Revenue Fund be paid directly to the heads of court. This imperative contributes to enhancing the independence of the judiciary. iii. Recommendations 278. The APR Panel recommends that: • The judiciary and legislature manage their own budget to enhance their financial autonomy. The funding should derive directly from the Federal Account to the judiciary without interference by the executive, in line with the constitutional stipulations. (Judiciary, National Assembly, Ministry of Finance and the executive) • The National Judicial Service Commission should exercise greater responsibility in the appointment of judicial officers, even though, in line with international practice, the head of state should appoint the senior judges upon the recommendation of either the National Judicial Service Commission or the legislature. (Judiciary, Ministry of Justice and the executive) • Judicial independence should also be enhanced by increasing and rationalising remuneration and terms of service, especially for lowerlevel judicial officers. Technological assistance should be provided for the judiciary so as to facilitate the speedy administration of justice. (Judiciary, Ministry of Justice and the National Assembly) • The legislatures at national and state levels need to have a greater say in the budgetary process for the legislative bodies and to enjoy some degree of oversight control regarding expenditure through an independent body that is not under the control of the executive. They should draw their funds directly from the consolidated accounts. (Federal government, states and local government) 105