judgments concerning the powers of the National Assembly to extend the tenure of local government chairpersons, the registration of political parties, state control over natural resources, and the management of the Federal Account, among others. In the ongoing determination of election disputes, the courts have also demonstrated independence through their ability to rule against candidates of the ruling party as well as candidates from the opposition parties. A number of gubernatorial elections have also been nullified and fresh elections ordered. The legislature 267. Although the provisions of the 1999 constitution give the legislature sufficient powers to enable it to check executive excesses, its independence is compromised by historical and administrative factors. While the executive branch had always survived under the military governments, the constitutional provisions applicable to the legislature were always suspended. More or less for the same reason, the legislature has never truly enjoyed financial autonomy. The legislature is dependent on the executive for budgetary allocations; hence it is always compromised by the executive. 268. The National Assembly has been able to resist the executive on a number of significant issues and has overridden four out of 10 presidential vetoes on bills it has passed. In the bid to effect a change in the law to allow a third term for the erstwhile president, the National Assembly also rejected the executive pressure. Hence a significant number of Nigerians perceive the legislature as being fairly effective in exercising oversight over the executive and thus it is gaining in public confidence. ii. Findings of the CRM Relations between the executive and the legislature 269. The CRM learnt that separation of powers is not adequately achieved in Nigeria since the judiciary and legislature at national and state levels are heavily dependent on, or subordinated to, the executive. In a system of separation of powers, the central power that legislatures need in order to exercise their oversight roles is the control of the budget. However, according to stakeholders, Nigerian legislatures do not have this power. In addition, legislative control over key accountability institutions, like the auditor general and the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC), is very weak in Nigeria. The presidency has yet to respect a budget passed by the National Assembly since the inception of civilian administration, while the state assemblies typically do not know the significant line items in the budgets they pass, and local government councils are absolutely dependent on the local government chairpersons. 270. The CRM was informed by stakeholders that the National Assembly has made important strides towards exercising some leverage over the executive. In the absence of financial leverage to bargain with the executive, 103