vacancies and submission of applications by qualified judges and other qualified lawyers. Theoretically, nominees are selected based on their qualification and experience. The President and the Vice-President of the Supreme Court are also appointed by the President after consultation with the CSMJ. 346. The Constitution provides for the CSMJ, which is the body responsible for the management and discipline of the Judiciary. The CSMJ is mandated to: • Nominate, appoint, transfer, promote, exonerate and evaluate professional merit, take disciplinary action and, in general, carry out all acts of the same nature in relation to members of the Judiciary; • Evaluate professional merit and take disciplinary action in relation to officers of justice, without prejudice to the disciplinary powers assigned to judges; • Propose extraordinary inspections, inquiries and investigations to the courts; and • Give opinions and make recommendations on the policy of the Judiciary on its own initiative, or at the request of the President of the Republic, the President of the Assembly of the Republic, or the government. 347. The composition of the CSMJ includes the President of the Supreme Court (who presides over the council), the Vice-President of the Supreme Court, two members appointed by the President of the Republic, five members elected by the Assembly of the Republic (according to principles of proportional representation) and seven judges (from the different categories of judges and all elected by their peers). According to the Constitution, the CSMJ shall incorporate officers of justice elected by their peers for discussion and deliberation on matters related to professional merit and to the exercise of disciplinary authority over them. 348. AfriMAP’s report, Mozambique: Justice sector and the rule of law, has been acknowledged as a well-integrated, consistent review of the Mozambican justice administration system, conducted over the past five years. The report refers to the Executive’s failure to comply with the law: “In practice there has been tension between, on the one hand, the courts attempting to confirm their independence, and on the other, the Executive and Legislature attempting to maintain their historical control over the Judiciary.” 349. Judges and prosecutors interviewed during the course of AfriMAP’s research listed specific examples of “undue” interference with the courts, both directly and indirectly, by members of the Executive seeking to influence legal decisions. Interferences reported included government officials applying pressure on the criminal investigation police (PIC), prosecutors and judges regarding cases they were handling. The report also refers to lawyers interviewed who said that, based on personal experience, they had no doubt that ministers and other high-ranking government officials exert strong pressure on judges and prosecutors. This leads to arbitrary rulings and frequently to situations where judges release detainees before a charge can be formed against them. 128 A P R M COU N T RY R EV IEW R EP ORT NO. 11