II. Findings of the CRM Separation of Powers 341. It is clear that Mozambique is experiencing difficulties as far as the separation of powers and the autonomy of the Executive, Legislature and Judiciary are concerned. This flows from the constitutional structure, which provides for a strong and powerful President backed by the Executive, as opposed to an ineffective, weak and under-resourced Legislature and Judiciary. In line with practice in Lusophone countries, the President is empowered to appoint the President of the Supreme Court and the heads of the Constitutional and Administrative Courts, which power the General Assembly is unable to challenge effectively. 342. The constitutional mechanisms to ensure accountability, transparency and horizontal control are limited. The President and the government are not politically accountable to the General Assembly. According to Article 202(1) of the Constitution, the government must, however, discharge its functions in accordance with the decisions of the President and the Assembly. The Constitution provides a jurisdictional mechanism for the resolution of conflict between the different branches of government by means of the Constitutional Council. However, in Mozambican political history, there is no record of any relevant institutional conflict between two sovereign bodies. This makes it particularly difficult to assess allegations and perceptions of attempts by the Executive and Legislature to exert influence over the Judiciary. 343. A further impediment to good governance and the rule of law is the uneasy power balance between FRELIMO and RENAMO. The country and its governance structures are clearly divided between strongholds of either of the parties, and political intolerance is rife. The CRM observed that, both in the capital and in the provinces, political opinions are not freely expressed. Fears have been expressed that the General Assembly is hamstrung by the rift between the two major parties, which contributes to its incapacity to offer credible checks and balances to a strong Executive. Independence and Accountability of Judges 344. The 2004 Constitution has enhanced the principle of judicial independence. Article 217 provides that judges shall be independent, impartial and accountable, and shall owe obedience only to the law. Judges also require prior authorisation to undertake any other private or public activity. 345. The Supreme Court is the highest body within the hierarchy of courts. It is composed of Counsellor Judges nominated by the President of the Republic on the recommendation of the Higher Council of the Judiciary (CSMJ). Candidates are recruited through a competitive process starting with public advertisement of 127